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IF ANYONE IS LISTENING, #METOO: 
BREAKING THE CULTURE OF SILENCE 
AROUND SEXUAL ABUSE THROUGH 
REGULATING NON-DISCLOSURE 
AGREEMENTS AND SECRET 
SETTLEMENTS 
Abstract: Secrecy is an ally of sexual violence. For decades, victims of sexual 
abuse have remained silent about their experiences. The recent emergence of the 
#MeToo movement in the aftermath of the scandals surrounding movie mogul 
Harvey Weinstein and television personalities Roger Ailes and Bill O’Reilly rais-
es larger questions about whether employers are partly to blame because of the 
widespread use of non-disclosure agreements in settlements. The movement, 
while exposing the magnitude of the problem, also makes it clear that silencing 
victims’ speech means that sexual violence will never truly be settled. This Note 
argues that non-disclosure agreements in cases of sexual assault and sexual har-
assment should be heavily regulated, both by using content-neutral checks on the 
enforcement of these pernicious contracts and through legislative action that 
holds the abusers and their lawyers accountable. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 5, 2017, the New York Times revealed that Hollywood pro-
ducer Harvey Weinstein had reached at least eight settlements with women in 
response to allegations of sexual harassment, some dating back to 1990.1 
Weinstein would lure women into hotel rooms using the pretense of work and 
then tell them that he would boost their careers if they accepted his sexual ad-
vances.2 Weinstein’s behavior was no secret among his former and current em-
ployees, including his assistants and top executives of the Weinstein Company, 
but only a handful ever confronted him.3 One reason for this lack of confronta-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for 
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-
harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/GKZ8-S49N]. 
 2 See id. (explaining Weinstein’s modus operandi when it came to preying on women). 
 3 See id. (noting how Weinstein’s behavior was kept a secret for decades by the Weinstein Com-
pany and its executives). Speaking up against Weinstein was very costly. Id. Weinstein was known to 
have a volatile personality and would often get extremely angry with both male and female employees 
of the Weinstein Company over trivial matters. Id. His power, however, was unparalleled—he ruled at 
the confluence of power and money in Hollywood, and a job with him could give a big boost to any-
one’s career. Id. Thus, most of the women whom he abused never felt that they could voice their sto-
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tion was that Weinstein enforced a strict code of silence at the workplace.4 An-
other reason was Weinstein’s use of non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”) in 
settlements with the victims, wherein the women accepting payouts agreed to 
strict confidentiality clauses that prohibited them from speaking about the deal 
and the events that led up to it.5 
There are many beneficial purposes of NDAs, but in the context of sexual 
assault and sexual harassment, they are incredibly pernicious contracts.6 Tech-
nically, individuals are free to enter any contract.7 There is, however, some-
                                                                                                                           
ries publicly, but most did confide in co-workers. Id. The employees of the Weinstein Company, how-
ever, were also bound by their non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”), which prohibited them from 
criticizing the company. Id. Thus, Weinstein silenced even those who knew about these abuses. Id. 
 4 See id. (explaining Weinstein’s use of confidentiality clauses in his employees’ employment 
contracts). Confidentiality clauses in their employment contracts barred employees of the Weinstein 
Company from criticizing the company, or its leaders, in a way that could harm the company’s reputa-
tion or an executive’s personal reputation. See id.; see also Daniel Hemel & Dorothy Shapiro Lund, It 
May Not Matter What the Weinstein Company Knew, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-company-legal-consequences/542838/ 
[https://perma.cc/KYV6-WZBH] (discussing whether the board members of the Weinstein Company 
knew about the secret settlements between Weinstein and these women). 
 5 Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Hemel & Lund, supra note 4. In addition to NDAs, forced 
arbitration clauses are another tool frequently used to keep victims of sexual assault and sexual har-
assment silent. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECONOMIC POLI-
CY INSTITUTE 1–2 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-
arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/8BGW-G9JR] (explaining the growing trend in the use of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in employment agreements). Under such clauses, employees whose rights have 
been violated cannot pursue their claims in open court but rather must submit to private arbitration 
that research shows tends to lean heavily in favor of employers. Id. Between mandatory arbitration 
clauses and NDAs, only a small fraction of workplace sexual harassment and sexual assault cases are 
ever filed in court. See id. (explaining generally how mandatory arbitration clauses and non-disclosure 
provisions in employment contracts prevent most cases from being filed publicly in court). Senator 
Kirsten Gillibrand recently introduced bipartisan legislation in the U.S. Congress to eliminate forced 
arbitration clauses in employment agreements. Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act 
of 2017, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017). If passed, this bill would only require employers and employ-
ees to litigate sexual harassment claims, leaving unaffected all other arbitration-eligible claims. Id. 
There are many pros and cons for this proposed legislation, however, and a discussion of those is 
beyond the scope of this Note. See Jacob Gershman, As More Companies Demand Arbitration 
Agreements, Sexual Harassment Claims Fizzle, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/as-more-employees-sign-arbitration-agreements-sexual-harassment-claims-fizzle-1516876201 
[https://perma.cc/7KJD-ZDKY] (discussing the pros and cons of using arbitration agreements in cases 
of sexual assault and sexual harassment). 
 6 Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 264 (1998) (explaining the pernicious nature of contracts of silence). 
 7 Id. There is a “freedom of contract” in the American legal system. Id. But see W. Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391–92 (1937) (explaining that there is no absolute freedom to do as one 
wills or to contract as one chooses, and that the guaranty of liberty in the constitution does not deny 
the government the power to provide restrictive safeguards or to exercise oversight on the contract 
formation process). Classical contract theory came about in the late nineteenth century to set the stage 
for the values that govern the formation, performance and enforcement of contracts. See Carolyn Ed-
wards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War Con-
tinues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 647 (2009) (explaining classical contract theory). Classical contract 
theory provides that there is freedom of contract between parties that have equal bargaining power, 
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thing offensive about a contract of silence, particularly in cases of sexual as-
sault and sexual harassment, that demands oversight and regulation.8 A prom-
ise to suppress one’s speech in this context implicates public policy favoring 
freedom of speech and undermines the public’s interest in knowing about these 
repeat sexual offenders.9 
This Note argues that because the most egregious offenders of sexual as-
sault and sexual harassment prohibit victims from speaking out through the 
brazen use of NDAs, courts should take on a heightened role in determining 
whether such agreements are enforceable as a matter of law.10 Allowing vic-
tims to speak out is a necessary form of prevention because it exposes the pat-
tern of abuse, warns those who might become victims, and encourages others 
similarly situated to come forward with their own claims.11 Part I of this Note 
provides an overview of the #MeToo movement, explains the use of NDAs in 
cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment, and outlines the steps taken by a 
few state legislatures to outright ban such agreements as a matter of public pol-
icy.12 Part II presents an overview of the three major institutional players im-
plicated in the formation, adoption, and enforcement of NDAs in cases of sex-
ual assault and sexual harassment and the tools at their disposal to tackle the 
issues raised by the #MeToo movement.13 Part III makes a two-fold argument: 
first, that courts should take on a heightened role in determining whether 
NDAs in such cases are unconscionable, made under duress, or unenforceable 
as against public policy, and; second, that states, instead of passing laws that 
prohibit these NDAs altogether, should pass anti-secrecy laws that would pro-
vide the required deterrence to serial offenders and their lawyers who protect 
them through the use of these pernicious contracts.14 
                                                                                                                           
equal aptitude, and equal knowledge about market conditions. Id. The classic statement of freedom of 
contract is found in a nineteenth-century English case. See Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. 
Sampson (1875) 19 Eq. 462 at 465 (explaining that there is a public policy that supports no interfer-
ence in the freedom of contract between “men of full age and competent understanding”); see also 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (defending the unfettered freedom of contract to strike 
down as unconstitutional a New York law that prohibited employment of bakery workers for more 
than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Mis-
souri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and abrogated by W. Coast 
Hotel Co., 300 U.S. 379. 
 8 Garfield, supra note 6, at 264. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See infra notes 173–248 and accompanying text. This Note is limited in scope in that it only 
addresses strategies to limit egregious and repeat offenders of sexual assault and sexual harassment. 
 11 See Garfield, supra note 6, at 264 (explaining that contracts of silence are often used to keep 
relevant and important information out of the public eye). 
 12 See infra notes 15–111 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 112–172 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 173–248 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE RECKONING OF THE “#METOO” MOVEMENT: THE RAMPANT USE OF 
NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS AND RECENT LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
BANNING SUCH AGREEMENTS 
The recent #MeToo movement has led to a rise in public scrutiny over the 
widespread use of NDAs by individuals in positions of power to silence the 
victims they have sexually abused or sexually harassed.15 Section A of this Part 
presents an overview of the #MeToo movement and the social context which 
gave rise to it.16 Section B explains the mechanics of NDAs and evaluates the 
benefits and consequences of using such agreements in cases of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment.17 Section C discusses the recent efforts made by state 
legislators to ban NDAs in cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment.18 
A. What Is the #MeToo Movement and Why Does It Matter? 
On October 15, 2017, just over a week after the New York Times broke the 
news of Harvey Weinstein’s secret settlements with women to hide his abusive 
behavior spanning almost three decades, Hollywood actress Alyssa Milano 
posted on Twitter asking women to respond with “me too” if they had also 
been sexually assaulted or harassed in the past.19 What started as a collective 
raising of hands across social media very quickly snowballed into a global 
movement, with the hashtag “MeToo” appearing in more than 500,000 tweets 
and 12 million Facebook posts within the first twenty-four hours.20 The speed 
with which the hashtag went viral suggested that almost all women and some 
men have experienced some form of sexual assault or sexual harassment in 
their lives.21 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://perma.cc/QYN9-
LBRX]. 
 16 See infra notes 19–35 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 36–90 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 91–111 and accompanying text. 
 19 Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017), https://twitter.com/Alyssa_
Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/2L66-AQSN]. Milano, with her first tweet, had 
hoped to demonstrate the magnitude of the problem, and she was right. Id.; see Kantor & Twohey, 
supra note 1 (outlining Weinstein’s behavior with women over decades, as revealed by the New York 
Times’s investigation). 
 20 Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global Moment: The Anatomy of a Viral Campaign, CNN 
ONLINE (Nov. 9, 2017), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoo-hashtag-global-movement/
index.html [https://perma.cc/WGE9-YFL9] (explaining how the #MeToo campaign went viral in just 
a few days using online social media). 
 21 See id. (explaining the virality of the #MeToo movement over social media); see also Sexual 
Assault in the United States, National Sexual Violence Resource Center, https://www.nsvrc.org/
statistics [https://perma.cc/9X6D-BJFC] (noting that in the United States, one in three women and one 
in six men have experienced some form of contact sexual violence in their lifetime). 
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Although Milano’s tweet kicked off a movement, this was only the latest 
iteration of the “MeToo” campaign.22 Activist Tarana Burke first launched this 
movement back in 1997 after hearing the story of a thirteen-year-old girl who 
had been sexually abused.23 Ten years after speaking with the young girl, 
Burke created Just Be Inc., a nonprofit organization that helps victims of sexu-
al harassment and assault and gave her movement a name: Me Too.24 
Even though the #MeToo movement was born out of a very real and po-
tent sense of collective unrest, it does not have a leader.25 The movement’s 
purpose is to convey a simple, yet loud, message to victims of sexual abuse 
around the world: you are not alone.26 Some pundits posited that the #MeToo 
movement would fizzle out at the end of the news cycle, but they were 
wrong.27 Within just a few short weeks, the hashtag #MeToo had become a 
global phenomenon over social media—it was tweeted over 2.3 million times 
across 85 different countries and shared in over 77 million posts or comments 
on Facebook.28 Time Magazine encapsulated this movement by naming as its 
Person of Year “The Silence Breakers,” to honor the collective group of wom-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/MN7C-CZ8R] (explaining the story and rise of Tarana Burke). 
 23 Id.; see Tarana Burke, The Inception, JUST BE INC., http://justbeinc.wixsite.com/justbeinc/the-
me-too-movement-cmml [https://perma.cc/3JUD-8QL3]. Tarana Burke, as a youth worker dealing 
mostly with children of color, had seen and heard her share of heartbreaking stories about abusive and 
neglectful parents when she met this young girl, Heaven. Burke, supra. During an all-girl bonding 
session at their youth camp, several young girls shared painful stories about their lives. Id. The next 
day, Heaven, who had been in the previous night’s session, asked to meet with Burke privately. Id. 
Heaven told Burke about her “stepdaddy,” or rather her mother’s boyfriend, who had been abusing 
her. Id. Burke, however, struck by Heaven’s pain, cut her off in the middle of the conversation and 
directed her to another female counselor who she thought could help Heaven better. Id. Although 
Burke thought she was helping Heaven, she did not realize that she had just rejected the young girl 
who had finally felt brave enough to open up to someone about her abuse. Id. As Burke watched 
Heaven walk away from her, all alone, she realized what she should have said to Heaven—“me too.” 
Id. Heaven needed to hear that she was not alone and that Burke understood her pain. Id. Thus, Burke 
started the #MeToo movement. Id. 
 24 Garcia, supra note 22. Although Burke was initially taken aback by Milano’s tweet, the two 
women eventually got together to collaborate on putting the focus back on the victims. Id.; see Burke, 
supra note 23 (explaining the start of the #MeToo movement for Tarana Burke). 
 25 See Stephanie Zacharek et al., The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), http://time.com/
time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/D2Q5-Y4UU] (honoring the women 
who came forward with their stories of sexual assault and sexual harassment in light of the #MeToo 
movement). 
 26 Tarana Burke & Alyssa Milano, We Created the #MeToo Movement. Now It’s Time for #Her-
Too, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/dec/21/we-
created-the-metoo-movement-now-its-time-for-hertoo [https://perma.cc/4GHU-FMBD]; see Zacharek 
et al., supra note 25 (noting the reckoning brought about by the #MeToo movement, which has shown 
women around the world that they are not alone). 
 27 See Fox & Diehm, supra note 20 (explaining the virality of the #MeToo movement). 
 28 See id. (noting the statistics of how quickly the #MeToo hashtag spread across the internet). 
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en who spoke up and confronted their abusers.29 These women (and a few 
men) risked their careers and reputations to stand up for what is right and 
speak up against their harassers.30 
There is a lot of conversation around the future of the movement.31 Most 
importantly, there is a push to shift the public focus away from celebrities to 
everyday women who face sexual harassment daily but do not have the means 
or access to pursue legal remedies or media publicity.32 In an interview, Asso-
ciate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg addressed this 
issue head-on and stated that she hopes this movement extends to working 
women who have never had anyone take them and their concerns about work-
place abuse seriously.33 This is part of the goal of “Time’s Up,” a campaign put 
together by a group of powerful Hollywood actors, which has raised $20 mil-
lion for a legal defense fund to help working class women.34 The #MeToo 
movement sends a very strong message that women can no longer be silenced, 
or at least silenced discreetly, with the use of secret settlements in cases of 
sexual assault and sexual harassment.35 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Nicole Karlis, How NDAs Silence Victims, SALON (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.salon.
com/2017/12/10/how-non-disclosure-agreements-silence-victims/ [https://perma.cc/5UD3-TL5E] 
(explaining how secret settlements do not necessarily mean justice for the victims); Zacharek et al., 
supra note 25 (honoring the “Silence Breakers” as Time Magazine’s Person of the Year). 
 30 Karlis, supra note 29. 
 31 See, e.g., Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment: What’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2F3BpnU [https://perma.cc/8HXS-UC68] (explaining the rise of the Time’s Up 
movement as a natural continuation of the #MeToo movement). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Dartunorro Clark, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Says #MeToo Has ‘Staying Power’ and Can Withstand 
Backlash, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-says-metoo-has-staying-power-can-withstand-n847071 [https://perma.cc/PHU7-
AJX8]. 
 34 Open Letter from Time’s Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2018/01/01/arts/02women-letter.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/YJ3Z-VHLR]; Cara Buckley, Powerful 
Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment Action Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-up-hollywood-women-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.
cc/C3HV-AQ46]; Erin Nyren, Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund Has Raised $20 Million, Received 
1,000 Help Requests, VARIETY (Feb. 5, 2018), http://variety.com/2018/biz/news/times-up-campaign-
legal-defense-fund-ava-duvernay-natalie-portman-1202688683/ [https://perma.cc/QHW2-W24H]. 
Influenced by the rise of the #MeToo movement, over 300 prominent actresses and other executives 
from Hollywood got together to create this initiative to fight systemic sexual harassment in Holly-
wood and in other workplaces across the country. Open Letter from Time’s Up, supra. This initiative 
includes a legal defense fund to help less privileged women protect themselves from workplace sexual 
assault and sexual harassment, legislation to penalize companies that tolerate persistent harassment 
and to discourage the widespread use of NDAs to silence victims, and a push to achieve gender bal-
ance at Hollywood. Id. Since its inception, the initiative has raised $20 million for its legal defense 
fund and received 1,000 requests for help. Id. 
 35 Jennifer Wright, Is Time’s Up the Next Step in the Me Too Movement?, HARPER’S BAZAAR 
(Jan. 5, 2018), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a14754192/metoo-2018-ending-sexual-
assault/ [https://perma.cc/WX3U-XFHF]. But see Mark Landler, Trump, Saying ‘Mere Allegation’ 
Ruins Lives, Appears to Doubt #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
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B. What Are Non-Disclosure Agreements and Whom Do They Protect? 
1. Non-Disclosure Agreements and How They Are Enforced 
If a contract is a legally enforceable promise, a contract of silence is an 
enforceable promise to keep quiet about something.36 Even though a person 
may attempt to sell his silence on anything, a contract will arise only if a buyer 
desires to purchase the silence.37 Furthermore, like other types of promises, a 
promise of silence will usually be enforceable only when it is supported by 
consideration.38 
NDAs covering government secrets or trade secrets are strictly enforced 
because of the understanding that our national security and private property 
interests are paramount.39 Although courts generally will not interfere with 
parties’ freedom to contract, in limited circumstances, courts have declined to 
enforce a contract in the name of public policy and in the interest of disclosure 
to the public.40 Examples of this include whistleblower actions and contracts to 
conceal a crime.41 Courts also have the power in civil cases to void confidenti-
                                                                                                                           
com/2018/02/10/us/politics/trump-porter-me-too-movement.html [https://perma.cc/5S7R-K5FX] 
(interpreting President Trump’s tweet on the #MeToo movement). 
 36 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (“A contract is a 
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”) 
 37 See id. § 71 (stating the “bargained for” requirement of consideration). 
 38 See id. §§ 71–94 (explaining the role of consideration in the formation of a contract); see also 
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 2.2–.4 (1990) (discussing the requirement of consideration); 
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 55, at 204–05 (3d ed. 1990) (same). 
 39 Anna Lind-Guzik, Don’t Let Powerful Men Keep Buying Women’s Silence with Non-
Disclosure Agreements, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/dont-let-
powerful-men-keep-buying-womens-silence-with-non-disclosure-agreements [https://perma.cc/H49E-
JGK9]. 
 40 See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Con-
tract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116–17 (1988) (discussing the public policy exception as a “rare 
limitation on the freedom of contract”); e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 610–11 (1936) 
(stating that “[f]reedom of contract is the general rule and restraint the exception”), overruled in part 
by Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). But see W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 392–93 (holding 
that freedom of contract is not an absolute right and it may be restricted when in the public interest). 
 41 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 548 (AM. LAW. INST. 1932); see id. § 554 (stating 
that contracts to suppress evidence are illegal and unenforceable); Lind-Guzik, supra note 39 (ques-
tioning why there is allegedly no public interest in exposing perpetrators of sexual assault and sexual 
harassment in this country); see also Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880–81 (Ill. 
1981) (allowing a claim for retaliatory discharge because public policy favors reporting criminal of-
fenses); Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (stating that judges should not be “restricted to the conventional sources of 
positive law (constitutions, statutes and judicial decisions)” and “are frequently called upon to discern 
the dictates of sound social policy and human welfare based on nothing more than their own personal 
experience and intellectual capacity”); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663, 665, 667 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to enforce a confidentiality agreement protecting teacher’s pedophil-
ia). See generally Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935) (ar-
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ality agreements where disclosure is in the public interest, and have done so in 
matters of public health as well as matters of product and environmental safe-
ty.42 Increasingly, however, courts have become reluctant to interfere with con-
tracts or to craft broad social policy in the absence of a clear, legislative articu-
lation of the policies at stake.43 
Before these agreements can be reviewed by a court, however, they must 
first be drafted and executed, and there are several ways to do that.44 First, the 
parties may come to an agreement during litigation and ask the judge to ap-
prove the settlement and its confidentiality, essentially creating a court order of 
secrecy.45 Alternatively, the parties may make the settlement contingent on the 
claimant dropping the case against the defendant and further promising to nev-
er speak about either the settlement or the events leading to the settlement.46 In 
this scenario, the court generally has no control over the agreement, as the par-
                                                                                                                           
guing that the modern statutory regime forces judges to act as mere arbiters of statutory law rather 
than framers of public policy). 
 42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmts. a–b. Historically, judges defined public 
policy based on their own perception of protecting public welfare. Id. § 179 cmt. a. Some important 
policies developed by judges over centuries include “the policies against restraint of trade, impairment 
of domestic relations, and interference with duties owed to individuals.” Id. Today, public policy is 
generally defined by the legislature, partly because it is equipped with superior resources to conduct 
investigations of the public interest. See id. § 179 cmt. b (explaining that judges must not make public 
policy decisions without first examining the relevant legislative scheme and legislative history). Leg-
islators, however, are often unaware of the contract law problems that may arise in connection with 
legislation. Id. 
 43 See, e.g., Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66–68 (1945) (declining to invalidate gov-
ernment eminent domain contracts based merely on the gross disparity between the original cost of the 
property and the government’s purchase price because Congress did not pass legislation allowing 
private citizens greater recovery); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) 
(declining to recognize a claim for wrongful discharge because the legislature had not yet done so); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. b (explaining that judges today must 
carefully examine the relevant legislative scheme and legislative history to guide their decisions on 
public policy). 
 44 See RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PER-
VERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 75–76 (1996) (describing the typical course of events leading to a 
secret settlement). 
 45 Id.; see Anne-Therese Bechamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Pub-
lic Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 118 (1990) (exploring the rules governing 
the permanent sealing of court records and the enforcement of covenants of silence in civil suit settle-
ments); see also Wendt v. Walden Univ., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542, 1996 WL 84668 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 16, 1996) (addressing confidential settlements that prohibited former employees from 
disparaging the university or disclosing any aspect of their confidential settlement); Kalinauskas v. 
Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993) (assessing sealed confidential settlement that prohibited plain-
tiff from discussing any aspect of her employment with defendant). 
 46 See Steven I. Katz, Comment, Unauthorized Biographies and Other “Books of Revelations”: A 
Celebrity’s Legal Recourse to a Truthful Public Discourse, 36 UCLA L. REV. 815, 842–47 (1989) 
(discussing whether NDAs with celebrities should be unenforceable on public policy grounds, but 
focusing on the public policy of preventing unlawful restraints of trade). 
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ties settle out of court.47 Once an NDA is signed by the parties, the penalties 
for breaking the contracted silence can be extremely high.48 An alleged victim 
may be forced to pay back not just the full amount of the settlement, but also 
an additional financial penalty and the other party’s legal fees.49 Given this 
huge financial risk, most victims who sign these agreements do not feel free to 
speak publicly about the events that led to the signing of these agreements.50 
2. Benefits of Non-Disclosure Agreements in Sexual Abuse Settlements 
Although NDAs have been the subject of scrutiny in sexual abuse cases, 
carefully drafted confidentiality clauses arguably can more generally serve the 
interests of all parties involved in the matter.51 Perpetrators of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment often seek this kind of secrecy for several reasons.52 
First, if the perpetrator has injured more than one victim, a promise of confi-
dentiality elicited from one victim might allow the perpetrator to continue to 
misbehave.53 This is because similarly situated victims will not know that they 
too can bring claims against the same perpetrator.54 This logic underscores the 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Laurie K. Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of 
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999). Courts may sanction confidentiality in one of 
three ways: protective orders on discovery materials, sealing orders on court records, or confidentiali-
ty provisions in settlement agreements. Id. This Note focuses exclusively on confidentiality provisions 
in settlement agreements. See infra notes 15–248 and accompanying text. These are especially com-
plicated because they are private contractual agreements between parties, where the court has a less 
significant role. See supra notes 36–43, and accompanying text. By terminating litigation, the parties 
save the courts significant costs. Dore, supra note 47, at 286. 
 48 Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on Sexual Harassment Claims, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589 
[https://perma.cc/PB6A-QQE7]. 
 49 Id.; see Dore, supra note 47, at 386 (explaining that to enhance and facilitate enforcement of 
confidentiality provisions, a settlement contract might authorize the recovery of liquidated damages, 
attorneys’ fees, and costs for breach of settlement); Mahita Gajanan, Chrissy Tiegen Just Offered to 
Pay McKayla Maroney’s Potential Fine for Discussing Sexual Abuse, TIME (Jan. 16, 2018), http://
time.com/5104941/chrissy-teigen-mckayla-maroney-nda-fine/ [https://perma.cc/BKU4-Q4B8] (ex-
plaining that McKayla Maroney would be liable for $100,000 for breaking the non-disclosure agree-
ment she signed with USA Gymnastics and speaking about her abuse by Larry Nassar). But see Gar-
field, supra note 6, at 292 (contending that such liquidated damages clauses are unenforceable because 
they “would not be a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s potential liability”). 
 50 Garrahan, supra note 48. Nevertheless, NDAs cannot lawfully prevent people from reporting 
claims to the police, governmental agencies (such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion), or from responding to a court-ordered subpoena. Id. 
 51 Elizabeth Grace, Confidentiality of Settlements in Sexual Abuse Cases—Necessary Evil or 
Positive? (Jan. 31, 2013), https://lernerspersonalinjury.ca/articles/confidentiality-of-settlements-in-
sexual-abuse-cases-necessary-evil-or-positive/ [https://perma.cc/AN7Y-VZU3]. 
 52 Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and Sexual 
Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314 (2018); see Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (explain-
ing Weinstein’s behavior with women over decades, as revealed by the N.Y. Times’ investigation). 
 53 See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 52, at 314–15 (summarizing rationales for why perpetrators 
of sexual assault and harassment seek confidentiality from their victims). 
 54 Id. 
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reasoning behind Weinstein’s frequent use of NDAs, which allowed him to 
continue abusing women for decades with impunity.55 Secondly, a settlement 
agreement with a non-disclosure clause provides certainty, finality, and closure 
for perpetrators who do not want to risk lengthy and public litigation over 
which they lack control.56 
NDAs also provide several benefits to victims of sexual abuse.57 This is 
especially true because sexual assault and sexual harassment still carry a lot of 
stigma for victims and the publicity can be personally embarrassing and scar-
ring, both in the short-term and in the long-term.58 Often, victims do not want 
to talk about their traumatic histories of abuse and their related personal cir-
cumstances; thus, being party to NDAs protects them from ever discussing the 
painful events that led to the settlement.59 Victims of harassment also tend to 
fear that knowledge of a settlement will harm future job prospects by tainting 
them as litigious.60 Furthermore, the difficulties of litigating such claims, which 
often involve a “he-said, she-said” scenario and a lack of concrete evidence, of-
ten force victims to settle with their abusers out-of-court.61 Moreover, it is possi-
ble that employers and harassers might be less willing to negotiate or pay a set-
tlement if they could not acquire an NDA, which could diminish victims’ bar-
gaining power in recovering damages.62 Thus, NDAs, when crafted meticu-
lously and reasonably, can indeed protect both abusers and their victims.63 
3. Consequences of Using Non-Disclosure Agreements in Cases of Sexual 
Abuse 
There are several consequences of using NDAs in sexual assault and sex-
ual harassment cases that became more evident with the rise of the #MeToo 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. For defendants, these clauses can and do impede subsequent plaintiffs from finding out 
about other instances of abuse or misconduct which, if known, might provide them with valuable 
evidence to strengthen their claims for compensation. Id.; see Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 56 Grace, supra note 51; see Levmore & Fagan, supra note 52, at 314–16 (summarizing the rea-
sons why defendants in tort cases seek confidentiality). 
 57 Grace, supra note 51; see Annie Hill, Non-Disclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the 
Contract of Silence, THE GENDER POLICY REPORT (Nov. 14, 2017), http://genderpolicyreport.umn.
edu/nondisclosure-agreements-sexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/
7VVW-LXWV] (listing the several ways in which NDAs help victims of sexual harassment). 
 58 Hill, supra note 57. 
 59 Grace, supra note 51. Victims appreciate the power of NDAs because the agreement, by bind-
ing victims from disclosing the events that led to the settlement, allows them to ignore any prying or 
painful questions from friends and family. Id. 
 60 Hill, supra note 57. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Grace, supra note 51; Hill, supra note 57. 
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movement.64 First, a widespread use of these agreements creates a culture of 
impunity.65 One of the most famous examples to illustrate this consequence 
came to light fifteen years ago when sexual abuse scandals rocked the Catholic 
Church.66 For years, the Church used confidential settlements to silence vic-
tims who had been abused by priests.67 Even though these agreements protect-
ed the identities of the victims, they also hid the identities of the priests who 
continued to serve at their parishes or other ministries.68 For example, in 1997, 
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany entered into a confidential settlement 
agreement worth almost $1 million, just under the amount above which the 
Church was required to reach out to its oversight board prior to approving any 
such settlement, to buy the silence of a young man who had been regularly 
abused by a priest since the age of twelve.69 This deal, so strategically aligned, 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Farrow, supra note 15 (explaining that the recent revelations of sexual harassment by men 
in Hollywood and politics has raised a lot of questions about NDAs, especially given the variety of 
consequences of using such agreements was revealed after the #MeToo movement). 
 65 See Jia Tolentino, Harvey Weinstein and the Impunity of Powerful Men, NEW YORKER (Oct. 
30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/harvey-weinstein-and-the-impunity-of-
powerful-men [https://perma.cc/SXJ8-A5ST] (explaining that the culture of impunity is evidenced by 
the fact that not all people who abuse face consequences). 
 66 See Matt Carroll et al., Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6, 2002), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-priest-for-
years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://perma.cc/87WC-QRLA] (providing details 
of the sex abuse scandal that rocked the Catholic Church, as revealed by the Boston Globe’s investiga-
tion). Between the mid-1990s and 2002, more than 130 people came forward with terrible stories of 
abuse by priest John J. Geoghan. Id. It was later revealed that Cardinal Bernard F. Law was aware of 
this and had been making secret settlements with victims on behalf of the Church and reassigning 
Geoghan to different parishes. Id. 
 67 Id. Since 1997, the Boston archdiocese has settled about fifty lawsuits against Geoghan, for 
more than $10 million, but no confidential documents were ever made public, nor was Geoghan’s 
notoriety. Id. 
 68 See id. (explaining how the Catholic Church settled several lawsuits alleging sexual assault and 
harassment). For decades, sexual misbehavior by Catholic priests was covered in secrecy. Id. Abusive 
priests like Geoghan often told young teenagers not to tell anyone about the abuse they had endured. 
Id. Parents who would find out about the abuse pretended to forget all about it. Id. The brave few who 
dared to shed a light on this continued abuse were almost always told to keep quiet. Id.; see Laurie 
Goodstein, Albany Diocese Settled Abuse Case for Almost $1Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/nyregion/albany-diocese-settled-abuse-case-for-almost-1-
million.html [https://perma.cc/Z6QU-TXEQ] (explaining that as the clergy sexual abuse scandal has 
come to light, many Catholics in America have been surprised and very worried about the amount of 
money the Catholic Church has doled out to pay victims to stay silent about the abuse). 
 69 Goodstein, supra note 68. The victim wanted to make this settlement public and tell the world 
about his abuse at the hands of a priest at a Catholic church. Id. This was not the first time that this 
victim had been abused by a priest—he was first abused by the Reverend Mark Haight while he was 
recovering from a surgery in a hospital at the age of twelve. Id.; see Sacha Pfeiffer, Critical Eye Cast 
on Sex Abuse Lawyers, BOS. GLOBE, June 3, 2002, at A1 (explaining the conflict among lawyers who 
represent victims and counsel them to accept settlement agreements). Plaintiffs’ lawyers were torn 
between representing the victims who did not want their private lives, or even their abuse to be shared 
publicly in a courtroom, and the Church’s insistence to only draft and use settlement agreements that 
included confidentiality provisions. Pfeiffer, supra. Furthermore, because many of these victims were 
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was thus entirely shielded from any public inquiry, which allowed the abusive 
priest to keep his identity private, continue working with the Church, and pre-
sumably, even repeat his abuse with impunity.70 The Catholic Church cover-up 
is unfortunately only one example (with Weinstein’s continued abusive behav-
ior in secret being another) of the danger of drafting and enforcing NDAs that 
do not take into account the public interests implicated in these transactions.71 
Secondly, NDAs are deliberately used by perpetrators to evade accounta-
bility for claims of sexual harassment and assault.72 One of the women Wein-
stein abused, Zelda Perkins, started working at Miramax almost two decades 
ago, but her time there was short-lived as her first experience of sexual har-
assment by Weinstein happened the very first time she was alone with him.73 
According to Perkins, Weinstein asked her to give him a massage in his hotel 
room while he was wearing just his underwear.74 Despite her saying no, Wein-
stein allegedly asked her to be in the room while he took a bath, which com-
ports with the stories shared by other women who have recently come forward 
about Weinstein’s abuse.75 The final straw for Perkins came with Weinstein’s 
attempted rape on her colleague in 1998, which prompted her to finally seek 
legal assistance.76 At that time, Miramax was owned by Walt Disney, and alt-
hough Perkins wanted to expose Weinstein by going straight to Disney, she 
was discouraged from doing so by her lawyers, who warned her that no one 
would take her word against Weinstein’s without concrete evidence.77 Per-
kins’s lawyers told her that her only avenue for recourse would be through a 
settlement agreement.78 This agreement included a non-disclosure clause, 
                                                                                                                           
struggling with their own mental demons, such as substance abuse and depression, their lawyers could 
not justify turning down the opportunity to provide monetary relief for them. Id. 
 70 See Ryan M. Philip, Comment, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in Non-
Disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 845, 845 (2003) (explaining how the Catholic 
Church strategically structured its settlement payouts to victims to shield itself from scrutiny). 
 71 See id. at 847. 
 72 See Farrow, supra note 15 (explaining how Weinstein evaded accountability for his actions for 
decades). 
 73 Garrahan, supra note 48. Perkins started working at Miramax due to a lucky meeting with 
Donna Gigliotti, a producer who was already working for Weinstein and Miramax. Id. This meeting 
led to a “script development” job at Miramax’s London office, where one day she was asked to fill in 
as one of Weinstein’s three assistants. Id. Due to her strong personality and her refusal to cower be-
fore Weinstein, she was eventually hired as his permanent UK assistant. Id. In this role, she frequently 
sat in on meetings with Weinstein and stars such as Leonardo DiCaprio and Gwyneth Paltrow and was 
made to feel like a valued member of the team. Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. In response, Perkins drew up a list of demands that she wanted to be written into the agree-
ment aimed at controlling Weinstein’s behavior. Id. Additionally, Perkins made a monetary demand 
for £250,000, which was immediately accepted, but the money was to be shared equally between 
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which both Perkins and her colleague were forced to sign in consideration for 
the payment, thereby silencing them from ever speaking out against Wein-
stein.79 
Perkins’s story also highlights the heavy emotional toll the negotiation 
process takes on victims, a third major consequence of using NDAs, which 
makes them feel unsupported and isolated given that they are often pitted 
against the legal might and power of their abusers.80 Perkins explained in a 
recent interview that, although the process she went through was undoubtedly 
legal at that time, she felt it was also immoral.81 Perkins is not alone in feeling 
this kind of despair, and the rise of the #MeToo movement has confirmed that 
for victims like her.82 Nineteen years after Perkins signed that NDA with 
Weinstein, she finally found the courage to break the terms of that agreement 
and speak out about her time at Miramax working for Weinstein.83 Although 
her experience with Weinstein changed the course of Perkins’s life and career 
forever, the rise of the #MeToo movement finally gave her some closure.84 
Lastly, the use of NDAs has left unchecked the rampant use of taxpayer 
money to avoid consequences for sexual assault and sexual harassment.85 It 
was recently revealed that Congressman Blake Farenthold allegedly used tax-
payer funds to settle a sexual harassment claim brought by a former spokesper-
                                                                                                                           
Perkins and her friend, whose abuse was the reason Perkins had decided to finally seek legal assis-
tance. Id. 
 79 See id. (providing details on Perkins’s NDA with Weinstein). 
 80 See id. (recounting how the negotiation process has “broken” Perkins); see also Emily Maitlis 
& Lucinda Day, Harvey Weinstein: Ex-Assistant Criticizes Gagging Orders, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-42417655 [https://perma.cc/W7UH-2BG3] (not-
ing that Perkins claimed that her lawyers told her that she “didn’t have very many options” in terms of 
legal action, and therefore, she was forced to agree to a secret settlement). 
 81 Maitlis & Day, supra note 80. Perkins explained in the interview that the last nineteen years 
have been terribly distressing for her as she has not been allowed to be herself. Id. Furthermore, even 
though she fought for her demands to be included in the contract, including one that required Wein-
stein to attend therapy, she did not think it was her job to follow-up on his obligations. Id. 
 82 Id. Perkins explained that the entire experience left her “broken” and distressed until now, after 
choosing to speak out in the aftermath of the #MeToo movement, in which dozens of women have 
come forward with their experiences of sexual harassment and assault. Id. 
 83 Garrahan, supra note 48. 
 84 See id. (noting how the rise of the #MeToo movement gave Perkins the courage to speak out 
against Weinstein); see also Chris Pleasance, ‘Accusing Weinstein Ended My Career’: Former Assis-
tant Says She Ended Up Training Horses in Central America After Legal Fight with Shamed Media 
Mogul Left HER Reputation in Tatters, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-5196571/Weinstein-assistant-Accusing-ended-career.html [https://perma.cc/LSL7-
LHYT] (explaining that Perkins was viewed as “suspect” by new employers after her battle with 
Weinstein, Miramax, and Disney, and eventually had to leave London and move to Central America 
to train horses). 
 85 Rachael Bade, Lawmaker Behind Secret $84K Sexual Harassment Settlement Unmasked, PO-
LITICO (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/01/blake-farenthold-taxpayer-funds-
sexual-harassment-274458 [https://perma.cc/56MT-V932]. 
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son.86 Lauren Greene, the Congressman’s former communications director, 
sued her boss in 2014 for gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and other 
claims relating to the creation of a hostile work environment.87 Greene, how-
ever, later dropped this case as she signed a secret settlement with the Con-
gressman, wherein she was paid $84,000 allegedly from an Office of Compli-
ance account.88 Farenthold is not alone in using taxpayer money to settle 
workplace claims; in fact, according to recent reports, more than $17 million 
has been paid out to public employees to quietly settle workplace disputes.89 
The fact that all of these consequences—a culture of impunity, no accountabil-
ity, lasting harm on victims, and abusing taxpayer money to avoid consequenc-
es—were hidden for so long is entirely due to the workings of a secretive legal 
process utilized by powerful people like Weinstein to silence victims of sexual 
assault and sexual harassment.90 
C. Aftermath of the #MeToo Movement: The Emergence  
of Legislative Reform 
In response to the #MeToo movement, lawmakers, both at the state level 
and at the federal level, have proposed several legislative solutions that range 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. In this lawsuit, Ms. Green stated that the Congressman had previously had “sexual dreams” 
about Greene. Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Bade, supra note 85 (noting how Farenthold made a secret settlement to his former em-
ployee using taxpayer money); Carroll, supra note 66 (noting how the Catholic Church used non-
disclosure agreements to keep sexual assault a secret for decades); Garrahan, supra note 48 (noting 
how Weinstein used a non-disclosure agreement to keep Perkins silent); see also Victor Mather, 
McKayla Maroney Says USA Gymnastics Forced Confidentiality in Sexual Abuse Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/sports/olympics/mckayla-maroney-usa-
gymnastics-confidentiality-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/GVH7-2XBV] (explaining how USA 
Gymnastics used a nondisclosure agreement as part of a settlement with one of its athletes, McKayla 
Maroney). Another example of the consequences of secret settlements has come to light in the case of 
Lawrence G. Nassar and his decades-long sexual abuse of America’s most promising athletes. Mather, 
supra. McKayla Maroney, a gold medal winner at the 2012 Olympic Games, is one of the many ath-
letes who has come forward recently to reveal that she was abused by the team doctor, Lawrence G. 
Nassar. Id. She recently filed a lawsuit against the United States Olympic Committee, USA Gymnas-
tics, and Michigan State University, Nassar’s employer, claiming that she “was forced to agree to a 
non-disparagement clause and confidentiality provision,” and that she would have had to pay more 
than $100,000 should she “speak of her abuse or the settlement.” Id. On a separate, but related, note, 
Nassar was recently sentenced to 40 to 175 years in prison after more than 150 young women accused 
him of abusing them over decades. Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar Sentenced to up to 175 Years in 
Prison for Decades of Sexual Abuse, CNN ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/
24/us/larry-nassar-sentencing/index.html [https://perma.cc/RB32-ZQ4C]. 
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from completely banning NDAs in sexual assault and sexual harassment cases 
to overhauling workplace policies and creating more equitable procedures.91 
In the New York State Assembly, Senate Bill S6382A, titled “An Act to 
Amend The Labor Law, in Relation to Contract Provisions Waiving Certain 
Substantive and Procedural Rights,” was introduced by State Senator Brad 
Hoylman.92 This bill, which is currently before the Senate Labor Committee, is 
aimed at preventing the enforcement of clauses in employment contracts that 
conceal details of harassment or waive procedural rights or remedies for em-
ployees in connection with the claim of harassment.93 Proponents of the bill 
argue that when employers compel employees to waive labor and anti-
discrimination protections as a condition of employment, especially when they 
relate to sexual harassment and discrimination protections, they are uncon-
scionable and should be explicitly prohibited in New York as a matter of public 
policy.94 The bill explains that the bargaining imbalance between the employer 
and the employee gives too much power to an employer who can continue to 
turn a blind eye toward abuses in the workplace, leaving the employee with no 
way of seeking justice.95 Furthermore, the bill provides that any such agree-
ment between an employer and an employee that would conceal this type of 
sexual assault or harassment is akin to a public hazard.96 In response to these 
concerns, the bill, if passed, would hold an employer accountable if he or she 
seeks enforcement of an existing non-disclosure clause, or if the employer re-
taliates against the employee for refusing to accept an employment contract 
with this provision.97 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Daniel Wiessner, Sexual Misconduct Outcry Makes Lawyers Rethink Confidentiality, REUTERS 
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-misconduct-agreements/sexual-misconduct-
outcry-makes-u-s-lawyers-rethink-confidentiality-idUSKBN1ED1DM [https://perma.cc/9B28-RCSA]. 
See generally Member and Employee Training and Oversight on Congress Act (ME TOO Congress) Act, 
H.R.4396, 115th Cong. (2017) (describing the proposed federal bill in response to the #MeToo move-
ment); Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) (describing the proposed California bill in response to 
the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. 3581, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017) (describing the proposed New Jersey 
bill in response to the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 2017) (describ-
ing the proposed New York bill in response to the #MeToo movement). 
 92 Sen. B. S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 2017). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.; see Daniel Hemel, How NDAs Protect Sexual Predators, VOX (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/9/16447118/confidentiality-agreement-weinstein-sexual-
harassment-nda [https://perma.cc/X6SC-5BKK] (explaining that the National Labor Relations Board 
has held that a secrecy rule that prevents employees from discussing their sexual abuse claims against 
a co-worker amongst themselves is an unfair labor practice that violates the Wagner Act). 
 95 See Sponsor Memo to Sen. B. S6382A, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6382 
[https://perma.cc/V9JC-53CY] (summarizing the key provisions of the proposed legislation). 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id. (explaining further that the bill, if passed, mandates that the employer’s liability would 
include payment of attorneys’ fees and costs and that the statute of limitations for a victim to file a 
claim against an employer’s practices for tort relief would be increased to up to three years). 
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In the California State Legislature, State Senator Connie M. Levya intro-
duced Senate Bill 820, titled “STAND (Stand Together Against Non-
Disclosures Act)” on January 3, 2018.98 In introducing this legislation, Senator 
Levya was motivated by the #MeToo movement and the fact that Weinstein 
had used NDAs to keep a lid on his abuses for decades, thereby evading public 
scrutiny.99 The law was passed by the California Senate on August 24, 2018, 
and is currently pending the signature of the Governor of California.100 The 
law would not prevent private parties from mutually agreeing to settle, but ra-
ther it will simply prevent the wrongdoer from requiring the victim to remain 
silent about the harassment as a condition of settlement. 101 
Similarly, New Jersey State Senator Loretta Weinberg introduced state 
legislation to ban NDAs that hide the details of sexual harassment in the work-
place.102 This legislation, introduced on December 4, 2017, prohibits any clause 
in an employment contract that forces the employee to give up any procedural or 
substantive rights or remedies in relation to a claim of harassment.103 
At the federal level, members of Congress responded to the #MeToo 
movement by introducing the “Member and Employee Training and Oversight 
On Congress Act (ME TOO Congress)” on November 15, 2017.104 This legis-
lation, introduced by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, would require all employees 
on Capitol Hill to undergo sexual harassment awareness training.105 Under the 
existing system, all employees on Capitol Hill are mandated to undergo 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
 99 Press Release, Senator Connie M. Levya, Senator Leyva Introduces STAND (Stand Together 
Against Non-Disclosures) Act, (Jan. 3, 2018), https://sd20.senate.ca.gov/news/2018-01-03-senator-
leyva-introduces-stand-stand-together-against-non-disclosures-act [https://perma.cc/8AKW-S9XV] . 
 100 Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018); see Laura Mahoney, California #MeToo Bills Head 
to Governor, with More on Deck, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 26, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/daily-labor-report/california-metoo-bills-head-to-governor-with-more-on-deck [https://perma.
cc/4FJ5-GLJA] (listing the bills relating to the #MeToo movement that are currently pending before 
the Governor of California). As of the time that this Note was published, Sen. B. 820 was awaiting the 
approval of the Governor of California. See Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). 
 101 Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). This bill was co-sponsored by the Consumer Attor-
neys of California and the California Women’s Law Center. Press Release, Senator Connie Levya, 
supra note 99. It seeks to ban NDAs pertaining to episodes of sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
Id. This bill, if passed, would apply not only to public employers, but also to private employers in the 
State of California. Id. 
 102 Sen. B. 3581, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017). 
 103 See id. 
 104 Member and Employee Training and Oversight on Congress Act (ME TOO Congress) Act, 
H.R.4396, 115th Cong. (2017); see Cristina Marcos, Lawmakers Unveil ‘ME TOO Congress’ Bill to 
Overhaul Sexual Harassment Policies, THE HILL (Nov. 15, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/
house/360489-lawmakers-unveil-me-too-congress-bill-to-overhaul-sexual-harassment-policies 
[https://perma.cc/85HV-Y6ED] (summarizing the key provision of the proposed Me Too Congress 
legislation). This legislation was introduced on November 15, 2017 to revamp existing workplace 
policy in Congress to deal with complaints of sexual harassment on Capitol Hill. Marcos, supra. 
 105 Marcos, supra note 104. 
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months of counseling before they are allowed to file a formal complaint 
against their abuser.106 After the complaint is filed and mediation has com-
menced, the existing rule requires that both parties sign an NDA to keep all 
documents used and discussions had during the mediation confidential.107 If 
mediation proves to be unsuccessful, then the employee has two options: file a 
case in court, or seek an administrative hearing, both of which would likely 
eventually lead to a confidential settlement.108 
If passed, this bill would make two significant changes: it would make the 
initial counseling, as well as the forced mediation, optional, and it would en-
large the statute of limitations to 180 days within which an employee must file 
his or her complaint.109 Perhaps most importantly, this bill would treat unpaid 
workers on Capitol Hill, including interns, the same as full-time employees 
and provide them with the same benefits and protections as full-time employ-
ees on Capitol Hill.110 Although it is promising that these ambitious legislative 
solutions have been introduced to tackle the issues raised by the #MeToo 
movement, it remains to be seen whether they will indeed become the law, and 
more importantly, whether more states in the country will also adopt them, 
thereby protecting victims throughout the country.111 
II. SELLING SECRETS: HOW TO HALT THE JOINT VENTURE BETWEEN 
ABUSERS, COURTS, LAWYERS, AND STATE LEGISLATORS 
This Part provides an overview of the three major institutional players—
courts, state legislatures, and lawyers—implicated during the formation, adop-
tion, and enforcement of NDAs and the tools at their disposal to respond to the 
issues raised by the #MeToo movement.112 Section A of this Part discusses 
content-neutral limitations on the freedom of contract, particularly those in-
volving unconscionability and duress during the contract formation process, 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. (summarizing the key provisions of the proposed federal legislation in response to the 
#MeToo movement). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id.; Susan Davis, ‘Me Too’ Legislation Aims to Combat Sexual Harassment in Congress, 
NPR NEWS (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/15/564405871/me-too-legislation-aims-to-
combat-sexual-harassment-in-congress [https://perma.cc/4TZR-EDBC] (summarizing the primary 
benefits under this legislation). 
 110 See Marcos, supra note 104 (noting the key aspects of the proposed legislation); see also Da-
vis, supra note 109 (same). 
 111 See Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Need to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change [https://
perma.cc/2ETZ-BSED] (explaining that although the introduction of legislation banning NDAs cre-
ates concerns that victims of sexual abuse will no longer be able to offer their silence as consideration 
for a considerable damages payout, such laws contribute to creating equality and safety in the work-
place). 
 112 See infra notes 112–172 and accompanying text. 
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and those determined to be against public policy during enforcement.113 Sec-
tion B introduces the idea that states can and should be our laboratories for 
testing new laws relating to the regulation of contracts that implicate a felony 
sex offense or conceal a public harm.114 It explains two such innovative laws 
that are already on the books in Florida and California, and provides a frame-
work for how they can be adapted to regulate and draft NDAs in cases of sexu-
al harassment and sexual assault.115 
A. Contracting Silence: How Courts Employ Content-Neutral Checks on the 
Formation and Enforcement of Contracts or Terms That Conceal  
Sexual Harassment or Sexual Assault 
Contract law is based on the principle that courts will enforce agreements 
that parties enter into voluntarily.116 If parties comply with the conventions of 
contract formation, the law provides relief in the event of a breach of that con-
tract.117 There are, however, certain limitations on the freedom to contract.118 
Some of the ways in which a contract or certain terms in a contract can be 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See infra notes 116–143 and accompanying text. The content-neutral rules of contract law 
include (1) rules of contract formation and interpretation, i.e., requirement of consideration, mutual 
assent, objective intent, definiteness, and written evidence; (2) defenses to enforcement, i.e., uncon-
scionability, duress, and public policy; and (3) limitations on remedies, i.e., monetary and equitable 
relief. Garfield, supra note 6, at 276–77. A content-neutral check on a non-disclosure agreement can 
bar enforcement even before the court must decide the substantive question of whether it should en-
force the promise of secrecy. Id. 
 114 See infra notes 144–172 and accompanying text. 
 115 See infra notes 144–172 and accompanying text. 
 116 Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 116 n.1. The earliest supporters of the “voluntarism” principle, 
known as “will theorists,” ensured that liability would only correspond to those who voluntarily bound 
themselves to a contract. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 
272 (1986); Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 116 n.1. Without a voluntary “meeting of the minds,” there 
was no contract. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 
997, 1012 (1985). This idea, however, has been discredited recently as an “insufficient explanatory 
theory for the results of contract law.” Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 116 n.1. In the late nineteenth-
century, theorists like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Samuel Williston began to clarify that a true 
contractual obligation was measured by a formal and explicit expression of the will to enter into the 
binding agreement. Dalton, supra, at 1012. They believed that an obligation to perform on the contract 
should attach not according to the “subjective intention of the parties, but according to a reasonable 
interpretation of the parties’ language and conduct.” Id. 
 117 Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 116–17; Val Ricks, Assent Is Not an Element of Contract For-
mation, 61 KAN. L. REV. 591, 653 (2013) (explaining that in order for a contract to be valid, six ele-
ments must be present: “(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) consideration, (3) an agreement that is 
sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no 
legal prohibition precluding contract formation”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (stating that a contract is “a promise or set of promises for the breach of which 
the law gives a remedy . . . .”). It is possible, however, that the theoretical right to remedy in a case of 
a breach is limited due to doctrines such as the mitigation and foreseeability doctrines that restrict 
recovery. Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 116 n.3. 
 118 See Kostritsky, supra note 40, at 116 nn.4–6 (summarizing the doctrine of illegal contracts 
that allows parties to void a contract when it is illegal or against public policy). 
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found unenforceable by courts include lack of capacity, duress, undue influ-
ence, misrepresentation, non-disclosure, mistake, impossibility, illegality, un-
conscionability and public policy.119 This section reviews unconscionability, 
duress, and public policy.120 
1. Unconscionability and Duress: Dealing with the Problem of Unequal 
Bargaining Power and Improper Threats 
Basic contract principles dictate that a contract or a provision in a contract 
may be unenforceable because of unconscionability.121 An unconscionable 
contract is a bargain that no man in his right mind would offer or accept.122 
Whether a contract or a term in a contract is unconscionable is determined by 
considering the setting of the agreement or term, that is, the procedural and 
substantive reasonableness of its scope, its purpose within the context of the 
events that led up to it, and its effect, positive and negative, on both parties.123 
Courts review several factors when analyzing a contract for unconsciona-
bility, including weaknesses in the contracting process involving bargaining 
power, duress, fraud, capacity, and other nullifying causes.124 It must be noted, 
however, that a contract is not unconscionable just because the parties have 
unequal bargaining power, or because the difference in power results in the 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151 (mistake), 159 (misrepresentation), 174 
(duress), 177 (undue influence), 178 (public policy), 208 (unconscionability), 261 (impracticability), 
262 (death or incapacity), 265 (frustration). 
 120 See infra notes 121–143 and accompanying text. 
 121 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. This section, titled “Unconscionable Contract 
or Term,” provides: “If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made, a 
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any un-
conscionable result.” Id. 
 122 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 
Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750)); see Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements 
Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 695 (1999) (summarizing the courts’ earlier interpreta-
tions of unconscionable contracts). The concept of unconscionability can be explained by reviewing 
some early definitions of the term adopted by the courts. Bast, supra, at 695. An unconscionable con-
tract is a contract that possesses an inequality so gross that it would be impossible to offer it to a per-
son of common sense without them being utterly shocked by it. Stiefler v. McCullough, 174 N.E. 823, 
826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931). Unconscionability is usually accompanied by the absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of the parties, as well as contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Nel-
son v. McGoldrick, 871 P.2d 177, 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) rev’d, 896 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1995) 
(Alexander, J. dissenting) (arguing that an unconscionable contract is an agreement that is “shocking 
to the conscience,” “monstrously harsh,” or “exceedingly calloused”). 
 123 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (“The determination that a contract 
or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect.”). Whether a 
contract or a term in a contract is unconscionable is determined by the judge given all material facts. 
Id. § 208 cmt. f. 
 124 See id. § 208 cmt. a (listing the factors a court can use to determine whether a contract or term 
is unconscionable). 
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weaker party assuming more risk.125 Furthermore, inadequate consideration on 
its own does not abrogate a bargain.126 Rather, it is a confluence of factors tak-
en together, like a large inequality in bargaining power between the parties, 
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, and a gross disparity in the 
values exchanged, that may indicate that the bargain involved either deception 
or compulsion.127 These factors could be evidence that the weaker party had no 
real alternative but to sign the contract.128 A court may thus find that when 
these factors are present, there is sufficient ground for finding the contract, or a 
term in the contract, unconscionable.129 
Under Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) § 2-302 and Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 208, when a court finds a contract unconscionable, the 
court is empowered to refuse to enforce the entire contract, refuse to enforce 
only the unconscionable clause and uphold the rest of the agreement, or to lim-
it the function of the unconscionable term to avoid an unconscionable result.130 
Courts typically consider unconscionability as an affirmative defense and gen-
erally require the party who allegedly breached the contract to bear the burdens 
of pleading and proving it.131 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Id. § 208 cmt. d. Unconscionability is not meant to do away with the doctrine of freedom of 
contract; rather, its purpose is to make sure that the agreement was a result of real bargaining parity 
between the parties wherein each party was able to negotiate meaningfully. Robyn L. Meadows, Un-
conscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the Elder Client: How Useful Is It?, 38 AKRON L. 
REV. 741, 744 (2005). 
 126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c. 
 127 Id. § 208 cmts. c–d. Technically, a court could find a contract to be unconscionable even 
though the bargaining process was fair and it is impossible to find a single term unconscionable. Id. 
§ 208 cmt. c. But see Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 165, 167 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) 
(explaining that the doctrine of unconscionability provides no relief to a party from all unfavorable 
terms that result from its bargaining position, but only from terms that are unreasonably favorable to 
the party holding great bargaining power). 
 128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d. There are several factors that a court 
may consider when determining unconscionability in the bargaining process prior to the formation of 
the contract. Id. These include: evidence that the stronger party believed that there was no reasonable 
probability that the weaker party would fully perform the contract, evidence that the stronger party 
knew that the weaker party would not be able to receive the full benefits of the contract, evidence that 
the stronger party was aware that the weaker party would be unable to protect its interest due to physi-
cal or mental infirmities; and other similar factors. Id. 
 129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c. 
 130 Id. at cmt. g; U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); see, e.g., Ingle 
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the store’s arbitra-
tion agreement was unconscionable because the store presented the arbitration agreement to plaintiff 
on an adhere-or-reject basis and the one-sided provisions grossly favored the store); Arnold v. Burger 
King, 48 N.E.3d 69, 81–82, 87 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (holding the mandatory arbitration agreement 
executed by plaintiff unconscionable because, among other things, the defendant drafted the agree-
ment, possessed superior bargaining power over plaintiff, and had knowledge of the employment 
environment and of other ongoing sexual-harassment and sexual-assault allegations concerning de-
fendant’s employees). 
 131 Hazel Glenn Beh, Symposium, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1028 (2015). But see U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1(explaining that the Uniform Com-
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Similar to unconscionability, a court does not enforce a contract or a term 
in a contract where a party can establish duress, meaning they were forced or 
coerced into entering the contract or accepting that term.132 Courts originally 
limited a finding of duress to threats involving life, disorder, or incarceration, 
but these restrictions have been broadened and currently, the threat need only 
fall within the categories explicitly listed in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts Section  176.133 In particular, a threat is improper if the resulting bargain 
is not on fair terms and there was an abuse of power in obtaining the contract 
or term.134 An example of this would be a threat to go public with embarrass-
ing or hurtful (and even untruthful) information concerning the weaker party 
unless he or she signs the contract.135 Another example would be a threat to 
unleash harmful consequences, particularly of economic value, unless the re-
                                                                                                                           
mercial Code (“UCC”) provides that courts can make a conclusion of law as to a contract or term’s 
unconscionability). Section 2-302 gives the court a leading, rather than supporting, role in determining 
unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (same). It states that it is the role of courts to find, as a 
matter of law, that the contract or any clause of the contract is unconscionable. Id. Furthermore, it 
states that it is the prerogative of the court to raise it when it is claimed or appears to the court that the 
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable. Id. In practice, however, courts disagree on 
how much discretion they have to raise unconscionability on their own. Beh, supra, at 1029; see 
Langemeier v. Nat’l Oats Co., Inc., 775 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985) (explaining that the UCC allows 
the court to raise this issue sua sponte). But see Creighton Univ. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 4:08CV460, 
2009 WL 756206, at *3 (D. Neb. Mar. 18, 2009) (refusing to consider unconscionability where it had 
not been pleaded). 
 132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (explaining the circumstances when du-
ress makes a contract unenforceable). 
 133 See id. §§ 175 cmt. a (listing the original circumstances in which courts found duress to inval-
idate a contract), 176(2) (explaining what makes a threat improper); see also 28 RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71:1 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2018) (noting that early law required threats 
of loss of life, bodily harm, mayhem, or imprisonment as grounds for duress); Ann T. Spence, A Con-
tract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
57, 79–80 (2003) (discussing the shift in contract law from requiring physical threats as a basis for 
duress to including unlawful threats and economic coercion). 
 134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2); see LORD, supra note 133, at § 71:3 (not-
ing duress is wrongful conduct that leaves the victim with no reasonable alternative but to agree to the 
other party’s demands). 
 135 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. f (explaining that these provisions 
are concerned with cases in which a party threatens to do an act that would harm the other party); e.g., 
Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that defendant’s purported bad faith threats to report the plaintiff to the SEC for alleged fed-
eral securities law violations and threats to breach the contract between the parties could constitute 
unlawful acts required to prove a claim for economic duress); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 475–
76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that ample evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the wife 
signed the premarital agreement while under duress, as the wife, a foreign national, did not understand 
the agreement when she signed it, had no money of her own to obtain the advice of counsel, and was 
pregnant with the husband’s child but was told by husband that she had to sign the agreement if she 
wanted to marry him prior to her visa’s expiration). 
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cipient agreed to the contract.136 A threat, however, even if improper, does not 
amount to duress if the victim has a reasonable and meaningful alternative to 
succumbing to the threat but fails to take advantage of it.137 
2. Public Policy: Dealing with Pernicious Contracts That Harm Public 
Welfare 
The policy against enforcing unconscionable contracts or contracts signed 
using improper threats shares commonalities with rules that render contracts or 
terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy.138 In fact, the two theories 
may intersect at times as unconscionability relates to either the public’s interest 
or the interest of one of the parties involved in the bargain, whereas concerns 
of public policy focus on society’s interest.139 A court’s decision to invalidate a 
contract on public policy grounds is justified by two main reasons: (1) the un-
derstanding, bolstered by the principle relating to the dignity of the legal sys-
tem, that the party seeking relief on this basis did not commit any fault, and (2) 
that a court’s refusal to allow such unconscionable contracts or terms discour-
ages their formation and use, which eventually benefits public welfare and ad-
vances public policy.140 
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a contract or a term 
in a contract is unenforceable as against public policy if either existing legisla-
tion dictates that such an agreement is unenforceable or the parties’ interest in 
its enforcement is plainly dwarfed by a public policy interest against the en-
forcement of the contract or a term.141 In evaluating the public policy against 
the enforcement of the contract or a term, a court is likely to consider the fol-
                                                                                                                           
 136 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. a (explaining that modern decisions 
have recognized as improper a much broader range of threats, including those constitute economic 
duress). 
 137 See id. § 176 cmt. d (explaining that the threat of a lawsuit does not constitute duress). 
 138 Id. § 208 cmt. a. The Restatement specifically notes that the policy against unconscionable 
contracts or terms overlaps with rules, which render contracts or terms unenforceable as they are 
against public policy. Id. In fact, the purpose of unconscionability is to allow the courts to enforce a 
community’s sense of what is right and wrong. Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 
30 HOUS. L. REV. 1819, 1849 (1994). 
 139 Bast, supra note 122, at 698. 
 140 Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1445, 1445–46 (2006); see John W. Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions—Reasons 
for and Against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEX. L. REV. 31, 38–40 (1946) (explaining that courts al-
ways phrase this argument as a need for “clean hands”). 
 141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. a (explaining that the term “legislation” 
encompasses any text enacted by a body that has the authority to make rules, including statutes, con-
stitutions, local ordinances, administrative regulations, and foreign laws to the extent they are applica-
ble). But see id. § 178 cmt. b (explaining that when a court uses “legislation” to find a term unenforce-
able, it usually does so on the basis of public policy derived either from its own understanding of the 
need to protect something about public good or from existing law that are relevant to the advancement 
of that policy). 
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lowing factors: (1) the relative strength of that policy as evidenced by legisla-
tion or judicial precedent; (2) the possibility that a denial to refuse the term 
will further enhance that policy; (3) the significance of any wrongdoing and 
whether it was deliberate; and, (4) the connection between the wrongdoing and 
the drafting of that contract or term in the contract.142 Enforcement, however, 
is only likely to be denied if these above-mentioned considerations clearly 
outweigh the law’s traditional interest to protect the parties’ expectations, the 
court’s abhorrence to any forfeiture that may result if enforcement were de-
nied, and any public interest in the enforcement of that specific term.143 
B. States as Laboratories of Our Democracy: How State Legislatures  
Enact Legislation to Regulate Contracts That Conceal a  
Public Danger or a Felony Sex Offense 
One of the most famous metaphors defending the virtues of federalism in 
the United States is that states can act as laboratories to enact a wide and di-
verse range of laws and that other states can learn from their experiences.144 
This metaphor is often understood to mean that a state experimenting with leg-
islation can often produce helpful knowledge for other states, and thus they 
                                                                                                                           
 142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3); see, e.g., Costello v. Grundon, 651 F.3d 
614, 627 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding and affirming that Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 states 
that a promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legisla-
tion provides that it is unenforceable); Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 379, 383 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(finding that a release-dismissal agreement, executed by the plaintiff in return for dismissal of the 
charges following her completion of an accelerated rehabilitation program, was contrary to public 
policy and, therefore, unenforceable); Jackson Purchase Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Local Union 816, 
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 646 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that there was a strong pre-
sumption that agreements that violated a statute would not be authorized by the courts, and that the 
public’s interest would be promoted by non-enforcement of the agreement); Hickey v. Scott, 738 F. 
Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that a waiver provision contained in the parties’ agreement 
could not be enforced to preclude client’s malpractice claims, because the rules of professional con-
duct prohibited a lawyer from making an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a 
client for malpractice, and a contractual provision that violated an attorney’s rules of professional 
conduct fell within the category of promises that were unenforceable on grounds of public policy). 
 143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2) (listing the factors a court considers 
when determining whether to enforce a contract or a term). Considering that private parties are free to 
enter into contracts, courts are usually hesitant to frustrate a party’s legitimate expectations about the 
performance of a contract unless there is a real public benefit to be earned in voiding that contract. Id. 
§ 178 cmt. e. 
 144 James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 
VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 476, 478–79 (1996). This metaphor first appeared in a 1932 dissenting opinion, 
written by Justice Louis Brandeis, in which he famously said “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system, that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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should be allowed to enact and implement new policies even though their effi-
cacy is uncertain at the time of implementation.145 
An example of this kind of experimentation is anti-secrecy laws, initially 
enacted in Texas and Florida but now adopted in many other states.146 These 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Gardner, supra note 144, at 478, 480–81. Unlike scientific experiments, policy experiments 
are undertaken to accomplish a certain social good, and thus, policymakers hope, even in the face of 
uncertainty, that their chosen policy achieves their goal. Id. at 480–81. It must be noted, however, that 
unlike the kind of information produced by scientific experiments, state policy experimentation pro-
duces information that can sometimes be individual, haphazard, or unlikely to yield information that is 
helpful for use by other states. Id. at 481. This is because policymaking inherently differs from state-
to-state, and thus, it is difficult for lawmakers and people from other states to evaluate whether those 
policies have been successful. Id. 
 146 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West. 2004) (effective July 1, 1990). The Florida statute categori-
cally forbids courts from entering any order that has the effect of concealing a public hazard or infor-
mation pertaining to a hazard. Id. Furthermore, it empowers the court to void contracts or agreements 
designed to conceal public hazards and requires disclosure of any information brought to the court’s 
attention which may involve potential public hazards. Id. Similarly, the Texas rule creates a “pre-
sumption of openness” and affirms public access to all court records. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. This rule 
creates a “presumption of openness” and affirms public access to all court records. Id. This “presump-
tion of openness” is only overcome if a party seeking to seal court records, demonstrates, after a pub-
lic hearing, a specific, serious and substantial privacy interest in sealing the record in question. Id. 
Although Florida and Texas were the first states to pass such anti-secrecy legislation, many other 
states since then, including Arkansas, Indiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Nevada, Ohio, Wash-
ington, Michigan, Delaware, and Georgia have followed their lead to pass their own laws or enacted 
rules affecting settlement confidentiality in varying forms and degrees. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-55-122(a) (West. 2003) (prohibiting contracts or agreements that restrict anyone’s right to dis-
close an environmental hazard); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-18 (West 2003) (providing that state-
ments submitted to settlement mediator are not public documents unless the parties agree otherwise); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.878 (West 2003) (exempting from public inspection except by court order 
personal information, scientific research, confidential or proprietary information disclosed to agencies, 
and other records); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(D) (West 2004) (declaring any agreement or 
contract that conceals a public hazard void and unenforceable); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912h 
(2003) (making medical malpractice settlements confidential and exempting such records from state 
freedom of information act disclosure); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0375 (West 2003) (barring set-
tlements with state government, employees, or legislators that require confidentiality in any terms and 
declaring such agreements void); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 216.1(a) (2004) (directing 
the court to consider interests of the public and the parties in sealing court records); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 132-1.3 (2003) (presuming open for public inspection all settlement documents in any suit, adminis-
trative proceeding, or arbitration against any state government agency or subdivision); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 17.095 (2012) (barring public bodies, officers, or agents from entering settlement agreements 
conditioned on confidentiality); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(4)(b) (West 2004) (providing 
that confidentiality provisions may only be entered, ordered, or enforced if the court finds the provi-
sion is in the public interest); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(4) (providing that the court may consider possible 
risks to public health, safety, or financial welfare in determining whether to issue a protective order 
over discovery materials); CAL. R. CT 2.550 (2018) (prohibiting sealing court records unless the court 
finds the interest against openness would be substantially prejudiced by disclosure); DEL. R. CIV. P. 
SUPER. CT. 5(g)(2) (2003) (providing that court records are only sealed upon good cause and subject 
to discretionary in camera review); GA. UNIF. R. SUPER. CT. 21 (West 2018) (requiring that courts 
find harm to privacy outweighing the public interest to limit access to court files); IDAHO APP. R. 
49(b) (2003) (deeming settlement conferences and all associated documents to be confidential and 
ordering the judge to destroy documents if the parties fail to settle); S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1(a), (c) (2004) 
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laws came about in large part due to the efforts of public access advocates who 
pushed for aggressive legislation to address the adverse effects of secret set-
tlements.147 The impetus behind such legislation is the understanding that liti-
gation uncovers a lot of otherwise unavailable information about practices, 
products, and people that may create a public danger.148 Common practices 
involved in civil litigation, however, including the use of court-sanctioned pro-
tective orders, sealing orders, and confidential settlements, can hide infor-
mation that might be helpful for the public to know so as to prevent any public 
disasters.149 The following subsections outline the anti-secrecy laws adopted 
by Florida and California to deal with secret settlements that either hide a pub-
lic hazard or a felony sex offense.150 
1. Florida’s Sunshine Act 
In 1990, Florida became a pioneer in anti-secrecy laws with the enactment 
of the Sunshine in Litigation Act (“Sunshine Act”).151 The Sunshine Act prohib-
its a judge from entering any order that intentionally or incidentally conceals a 
“public hazard,” which includes orders that seal documents, evidence, or settle-
ment agreements.152 It also voids, as a matter of public policy, any agreement, 
including private settlement agreements, that hides a “public hazard.”153 
                                                                                                                           
(prohibiting settlement agreements filed before the court from being conditioned on secrecy, but spe-
cifically disclaiming applicability to private settlement agreements). 
 147 Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Symposium, Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping Point?, 53 VILL. 
L. REV. 811, 814–15 (2008). 
 148 See id. (explaining the many reasons why court-enforced secrecy is bad); see also Andrew D. 
Miller, Federal Antisecrecy Legislation: A Model Act to Safeguard the Public from Court-Sanctioned 
Hidden Hazards, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 371, 379 (1993) (explaining the rationale of the pro-
ponets of anti-secrecy legislation). Supporters of anti-secrecy laws believe that the public has a “right 
to know” what takes place in the public court system. Miller, supra. They argue that when private 
litigants use courts to resolve their private problems, these suits become everyone’s business, and the 
general public has a basic right to be aware of how the parties are resolving the issues raised in their 
private dispute. Id. Opponents of such laws, on the other hand, tend to view anti-secrecy legislation as 
an unnecessary interference with a court’s role to create a balance between a private party’s interest in 
privacy and the public’s interest in disclosure. Id. at 375–76. 
 149 Anderson supra note 147, at 814–15. Examples of harmful information revealed during litiga-
tion but kept secret from the public include defects in lighters, car seats, breast implants, and all-
terrain vehicles. Id. at 815. Information about these defects were all subject to protective orders while 
countless members of the public continued to be at risk from using the products. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 
110-439, at 3–8 (2007) (summarizing examples of court enforced secrecy in product liability cases). 
 150 See infra notes 151–172 and accompanying text. 
 151 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West. 2004); see Roma Perez, Two Steps Forward, Two Steps 
Back: Lessons to Be Learned from How Florida’s Initiatives to Curtail Confidentiality in Litigation 
Have Missed Their Mark, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 163, 164 (2009) (explaining the circumstances 
that gave rise to Florida’s anti-secrecy legislation). 
 152 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3). As defined in this statute, “public hazard” means any instru-
mentality, including, but not limited to, a device, instrument, person, procedure, condition or product 
that has caused and is likely to cause injury. Id. An “instrumentality” is commonly defined as a 
“means” or “agency.” Instrumentality, WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 633 
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To properly determine the scope of the statutory term “public hazard,” it 
is necessary to evaluate the statute holistically, including its language, title, 
legislative history, and related current law.154 Courts in Florida have interpreted 
the word “hazard” to connote exposure to physical harm or a danger to 
health.155 Consequently, courts have interpreted the term “public hazard” to 
mean a “tangible danger to public health or safety.”156 
                                                                                                                           
(1984). The statute gives examples of an “instrumentality,” but does not explicitly define the term 
“injury.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2). The Florida legislature did not limit the definition of “injury” 
to cases involving personal injury, but instead extended it to include dangers to public health and 
safety. See Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (ex-
plaining that the term “public hazard” refers to a “tangible danger to public health or safety”); cf. TEX. 
R. CIV. PRO. 76a (requiring a showing that sealing records will not adversely affect the public’s health 
or safety). 
 153 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4). 
 154 Stivers, 777 So. 2d at 1025 (quoting Florida v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla.1981)). The 
statute, however, does not provide any guidance on the procedure a court must follow when determin-
ing whether an instrumentality, as defined in the statute, is a “public hazard” for the purposes of the 
Sunshine Act. Perez, supra note 151, at 193; see Andrew D. Goldstein, Symposium, Sealing and Re-
vealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 
81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 375, 424–25 (2006) (noting that the definition of a public hazard is limited 
because it requires the instrumentality in question to have caused injury in the past and be likely to do 
so again in the future). This ambiguity has resulted in Florida courts struggling to interpret the provi-
sions of the Act, and effectively and uniformly address the issues that come up during litigation. See 
generally Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jones, 929 So. 2d 1081, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“[T]he goal of protecting the public from hazards can only be accomplished by disallowing confiden-
tiality orders which protect information related to the hazard after a verdict and judgment have been 
entered against the manufacturer of a hazardous product.”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski, 
830 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the Act applies only when “health and safety 
issues are implicated” and not where solely economic harm is at issue); Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. 
Carnoto, 798 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]he trial court erred in deciding 
to defer ruling on petitioner’s discovery objections until resolution of the Sunshine Act issues.”); Sti-
vers, 777 So. 2d at 1024–26 (holding a settlement agreement requiring the plaintiff to maintain some 
level of secrecy did not violate the Sunshine Act); Smith v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So. 2d 895, 
896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“While confidentiality agreements are necessary in some instances, to 
facilitate settlement, they may not be subsequently employed by a litigant to obscure issues or other-
wise thwart an opponent’s discovery.”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dickerson, 654 So. 2d 1036, 1037 n.1 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“No decision was apparently made by either the master or the trial court 
relative to applying the [Sunshine Act] . . . .”); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So. 2d 
226, 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
merits of the Sunshine Act issues); ACandS, Inc. v. Askew, 597 So. 2d 895, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992) (per curiam) (noting section 69.081 applies to “a court order which conceals ‘any information 
concerning a public hazard’”). 
 155 Stivers, 777 So. 2d at 1026; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 122.34(1)(a) (West 2000) (concerning law 
enforcement officers as “high hazard” members of retirement plans); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3178 
(defining “high-hazard” coastal areas as “category 1 evacuation zones”). 
 156 Stivers, 777 So. 2d at 1026 (holding that “public hazard” connotes a tangible danger to public 
health or safety). Florida cases that have used the term “public hazard” have involved health or safety 
issues. See, e.g., Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 941 (Fla. 1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (regarding 
an intoxicated driver who posed a “public hazard”); City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784, 788 
(Fla. 1959) (stating a driver whose license had been suspended or revoked was a “public hazard”); 
Lovett v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 1079, 1080, 1082 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1981) (finding a car that had been 
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The Sunshine Act is unique because it takes the scope of the law one step 
further by refusing to enforce any portion of an agreement that is intended to 
conceal a “public hazard” or information pertaining to a “public hazard.”157 
Thus, even if parties settle their disputes using private contracts that include 
NDAs, they expose themselves to the real possibility that a court in Florida 
may choose not to uphold the non-disclosure provisions if it finds that they 
were intended to conceal a “public hazard.”158 Given the breadth of what the 
Sunshine Act covers, it would appear that Florida left no wiggle room for its 
defendants to demand confidentiality from its plaintiffs; however, that has not 
been the case.159 
Although the Sunshine Act is truly visionary in what it has set out to do, 
opponents of such anti-secrecy legislation believe that this trend towards lim-
ited confidentiality is not without its pitfalls.160 First, these opponents tend to 
view the most important function of judges and courts as deciding the immedi-
ate cases before them.161 Therefore, informing the public of any potential 
health or safety hazards should not be the foremost goal of the judicial sys-
tem.162 Second, they argue that legislation such as the Sunshine Act diminishes 
incentives to settle cases, which runs afoul of public policy concerns that favor 
                                                                                                                           
involved in a collision was not a “public hazard or nuisance”); see also Arthur R. Miller, Confidential-
ity, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 443 (1991) (explain-
ing that the Sunshine Act was passed through both houses of the government and was signed by the 
Governor into law in just a few days). 
 157 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (“Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose 
or effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any infor-
mation which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which 
may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.”); see 
also Perez, supra note 151, at 183 (explaining the scope of Florida’s anti-secrecy legislation). 
 158 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (not limiting the statute’s effect to agreements filed with or 
approved by the court); see also Perez, supra note 151, at 183 (explaining that a Florida court is likely 
to void a contract or term if it finds that the contract or term was designed to hide the existence of a 
public hazard). 
 159 THOMAS D. SAWAYA, 6 FLORIDA PERSONAL INJURY LAW & WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 
§ 13:9 (2d ed. 2008–2009) (explaining that there are not many reported cases interpreting the Sun-
shine Act to settlement agreements in products liability cases). But see Perez, supra note 151, at 184 
n. 115 (noting that the passage of the Sunshine Act did not deter many people in Florida from entering 
into secret settlements, as evidenced by the Bridgestone/Firestone tire product liability case). 
 160 See generally Katherine Sullivan, Letting the Sunshine in: Ethical Implications of the Sunshine 
in Litigation Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923, 928–29 (2010) (listing the arguments for and against 
limited confidentiality). 
 161 Id. at 928; see Miller, supra note 156, at 431 (explaining that the “traditional model of civil 
adjudication” in America revolves around the understanding that private litigants can bring a private 
controversy to a neutral arbiter, i.e., a judge, to resolve the case using neutral principles of law). 
 162 See Miller, supra note 156, at 431 (noting that a judge is not required to consider interests or 
matters outside the facts and issues in the case before him, or her and therefore, giving the general 
public access to information produced during discovery is not a primary benefit of civil litigation). 
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settlements.163 Third, they fear that public access to the discovery produced 
during the settlement stage, notably personal and financial information, could 
endanger the privacy rights of litigants.164 Fourth, they believe that by dimin-
ishing confidentiality, particularly in settlement agreements that involve a large 
payout, these laws promote meritless lawsuits by individuals who become 
more inclined to bring such claims now that they know the dollar amount of 
settlement.165 Lastly, these opponents argue that there is only anecdotal evi-
dence, if any evidence at all, to support the argument that courts are indeed 
engaging in large-scale cover-ups of public hazards, and therefore, we should 
be careful in using these laws to limit the privacy of litigants.166 Regardless of 
these objections to anti-secrecy litigation, there is a general consensus among 
lawyers, judges and legal scholars that there has to be some regard for the pub-
lic welfare when condoning and enforcing secret settlements that contain a 
“public hazard.”167 
2. California’s Felony Sex Law 
Following Florida’s lead, California also has a law on the books that pro-
hibits the use of confidentiality clauses in civil settlements if the “factual foun-
dation” for the underlying allegations involved acts that could be prosecuted as 
felony sexual offenses.168 The law applies to settlements involving allegations 
of rape or sexual assault, but not to cases that are only likely to be prosecuted 
as misdemeanors.169 Furthermore, the law also provides consequences for at-
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 928–29 (explaining that settlement unclogs the judicial dock-
ets and promotes efficiency in the judicial system, which reduces costs to litigants). 
 164 See Miller, supra note 156, at 466 (explaining that statutes like the Sunshine Act that restrict a 
court’s discretion to protect privacy could potentially violate the constitutional rights of the private 
parties involved). 
 165 See Miller, supra note 156, at 485 (explaining that for a defendant, a secret settlement guaran-
tees that the settlement dollar amount will not encourage frivolous litigants to commence their own 
lawsuits against the defendant). But see David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and 
Practice Restriction Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1227 
(noting that there is no real empirical evidence to show that public disclosure of settlement amount 
encourages meritless lawsuits). 
 166 Miller, supra note 156, at 477 (arguing that the number of cases that could possibly contain 
information that has any bearing on public health or safety is very small when compared to the num-
ber of cases in total being litigated throughout the country). 
 167 See id. at 491 (explaining that although the indifferent enforcement of settlement agreements 
is not a prudent idea, disclosure of any information must be controlled by judges and courts who are 
the neutral parties in these circumstances). 
 168 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (2018). This statute provides that “[N]otwithstanding any other 
law, a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure of factual information 
related to the action is prohibited in any civil action the factual foundation for which establishes a 
cause of action for civil damages for . . . [a]n act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense.” Id. 
 169 Id. Prior to passing this bill into law, state legislators in California acknowledged that settlement 
agreements are indeed very useful as they encourage quick resolution of claims and help parties avoid 
trial. ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS: AB-1682 2015–2016 Sess., at 1–3 (Cal. Aug. 10, 2016), https://
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torneys who fail to comply with its mandate.170 An attorney who demands that 
a confidentiality provision be included in a settlement agreement that conceals 
an act that may be prosecuted as a felony sex offense, or even advises a client 
to sign such an agreement, may face discipline by the State Bar of Califor-
nia.171 Because this law is fairly recent, no court in California has interpreted 
or applied it in any case. Given that it covers sexual acts that can be prosecuted 
as felonies, however, it has tremendous potential to be applied to rapes or sex-
ual harassment with criminal undertones that are settled with NDAs.172 
III. A CALL TO ACTION: NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS IN CASES OF 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL ASSAULT NEED TO BE BETTER 
REGULATED THROUGH CONTENT-NEUTRAL CHECKS ON ENFORCEMENT AND 
BOLD LEGISLATION THAT TAKES VICTIMS’ PREFERENCES INTO ACCOUNT 
Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to tackle all the challenges raised 
by the #MeToo movement, but the strategies proposed in this Part are a start as 
                                                                                                                           
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1682 [https://perma.
cc/K966-B8CY]. They, however, rationalized that there was still a strong public policy argument to 
prohibit the making of such secret agreements, especially if they involve vulnerable victims, or con-
done dangerous behavior and terrible conduct. Id. 
 170 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(e) (“An attorney’s failure to comply with the requirements of 
this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the 
disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise 
authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement 
that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of Cali-
fornia shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.”). 
 171 Id. Although a discussion on the Model Code of Professional Conduct is outside the scope of 
this Note, it must be noted that they too provide additional guidelines to lawyers facilitating secret 
settlements. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (originally MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980)). Although these rules are still somewhat 
aspirational in character and represent the ideals that every lawyer should strive for, there are three 
rules that are particularly pertinent for lawyers who draft and counsel secret agreements: (1) Model 
Rule 5.6(b), which provides that a lawyer must not participate in offering or making “an agreement in 
which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy”; 
(2) Model Rule 1.2(d), which is a mandatory rule that provides that a lawyer shall not counsel a client 
to engage in conduct that “the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent”; and (3) Model Rule 1.6(b), 
which is a permissive rule that provides that a lawyer may reveal information relating to the represen-
tation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes it to be necessary to prevent the client 
from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests or property of another. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(2), 5.6(b); 
see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 51, 53, 56 (2005) (explaining that Model Rule 1.2(d) is mandatory, meaning a lawyer shall 
not participate in a crime or fraud under any circumstances, but Model Rule 1.6 is permissive in that it 
is designed to appeal to lawyers’ sense of morality, encouraging them to act just like ordinary ethical 
citizens); Richard Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Harm, PROF. LAW. Summer 2001, 
at 19 (expressing frustration on how lawyers justify engaging in these secret settlements in the name 
of “zealous advocacy,” and explaining how this rationalization is archaic). 
 172 See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002. 
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they fulfill dual purposes.173 First, they serve to respect victims’ preferences, 
particularly given that these are alternatives to an outright ban on NDAs in 
cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment; and, second, they aspire to cre-
ate a trickle-down effect: if we make clear that the justice system will no longer 
tolerate this kind of flagrant abuse of power and resources, it may help reduce 
the frequency of such abuse even where legal action is not much of a threat.174 
Section A of this Part argues that courts should take a heightened role in 
determining whether NDAs in sexual harassment and assault cases should be 
enforced, especially given concerns of unconscionability, duress, and public 
policy.175 Section B argues that states should not focus on completely banning 
NDAs, but rather spend time drafting and enacting anti-secrecy laws like those 
in Florida and California that would provide the required deterrence in these 
cases.176 Furthermore, Section C explains that these anti-secrecy laws should 
be broadened to include consequences for attorneys who engage in either the 
drafting or counseling of agreements that hide repeat offenders of sexual as-
sault and sexual harassment.177 
A. Courts Should Take on a More Heightened Role in Regulating Non-
Disclosure Agreements Using Content-Neutral Checks  
on the Enforcement of Contracts 
A court should enforce an NDA in cases of sexual assault and sexual har-
assment if it was made voluntarily by the parties and supported by adequate 
consideration.178 Apart from the general principle of freedom to contract, an-
other good reason for enforcing voluntary NDAs is that sometimes such 
agreements are desirable by both parties, including abuse victims.179 For de-
                                                                                                                           
 173 See generally Emma J. Roth, Is a Non-disclosure Agreement Silencing You from Sharing Your 
‘Me Too’ Story? 4 Reasons It Might Be Illegal, ACLU (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/nondisclosure-agreement-silencing-you-sharing-your-me-
too [https://perma.cc/ETJ8-DKZA] (summarizing key reasons why an NDA, when used in the context 
of sexual assault or sexual harassment may be illegal). 
 174 See id. (acknowledging that there are some survivors of sexual assault or harassment who 
would prefer to not discuss any details). See generally Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) (de-
scribing the proposed California bill in response to the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. 3581, 217th Leg. 
(N.J. 2017) (describing the proposed New Jersey bill in response to the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. 
S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 2017) (describing the proposed New York bill in response to the 
#MeToo movement). 
 175 See infra notes 178–218 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra notes 219–232 and accompanying text. 
 177 See infra notes 233–248 and accompanying text. 
 178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (explaining that 
the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which the parties must manifest a mutual assent to the 
terms of the exchange and their exchange must be supported by consideration). 
 179 Hemel, supra note 94; see Edwards, supra note 7, at 647 (explaining the principle of freedom 
to contract); Danielle Paquette, How Confidentiality Agreements Hurt—and Help—Victims of Sexual 
Harassment, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/11/
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fendants, these clauses provide certainty and closure.180 For victims, these 
clauses help maintain the secrecy of the abuse; facilitate out-of-court settle-
ments, which reduces the stigma of abuse; and, provide for greater bargaining 
power in exacting higher settlement values.181 Given these mutual benefits, the 
recent move by some state legislatures to outright ban these agreements is 
short-sighted.182 In light of the #MeToo movement, however, it has become 
clear that because these agreements can be weaponized to keep abusers hidden 
from public scrutiny, they must, at the very least, be closely scrutinized and 
regulated by the courts.183 
The first step that courts can take to regulate these NDAs is scrutinize 
them for unconscionability and determine if they were made under duress.184 
An unconscionable contract is a bargain that no man in his right mind and not 
under any delusion would offer on one hand and accept on the other.185 Like 
unconscionability, duress involves an improper threat that coerces the weaker 
party to sign on to the contract.186 Although the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts states that a bargain is not necessarily unconscionable or made under 
duress just because the parties were unequal in power, it does provide that a 
                                                                                                                           
02/how-confidentiality-agreements-hurt-and-help-victims-of-sexual-harassment/?utm_term=.96cfc
1b35307 [https://perma.cc/623Q-UW9W] (explaining how confidentiality agreements can sometimes 
help victims of sexual harassment). 
 180 See Grace, supra note 51(explaining that confidentiality clauses can provide closure for perpe-
trators). 
 181 See id. (explaining the several benefits of confidentiality clauses to victims); see also Hill, 
supra note 57 (same). 
 182 See generally Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) (describing the proposed California 
bill in response to the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 2017) (de-
scribing the proposed New York bill in response to the #MeToo movement). 
 183 See Farrow, supra note 15 (explaining how Weinstein evaded accountability for his actions for 
decades by using non-disclosure agreements); see also Garfield, supra note 6, at 275 (explaining the 
need for regulating contracts of silence). The law has already recognized the need for regulating some 
contracts of silence, given that courts refuse to enforce contracts that conceal a crime. Garfield, supra 
note 6, at 275. Beyond these limited and extreme scenarios, however, the precedent on regulating such 
contracts is sparse. Id. 
 184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174, 208 (explaining the concepts of duress 
and unconscionability that can render a contract or a term unenforceable). 
 185 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 
Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750)); see Bast, supra note 122, at 695 (summarizing the courts’ earlier interpre-
tations of unconscionable contracts). An unconscionable contract is a contract that possesses an ine-
quality so gross that it would be impossible to offer it to anyone with common sense without that 
person being utterly shocked by it. Stiefler v. McCullough, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931). 
Unconscionability is usually accompanied by the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of 
the parties, as well as contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Nelson v. McGoldrick, 871 
P.2d 177, 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (Alexander, J. dissenting) (arguing that an unconscionable con-
tract is an agreement that is “shocking to the conscience,” “monstrously harsh,” or “exceedingly cal-
loused”). 
 186 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1). 
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confluence of factors, taken together, may indicate that the bargain involved 
unacceptable deception or compulsion.187 
In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary and state legislators are gener-
ally unwilling to interfere with agreements decided between two parties occu-
pying relatively equal bargaining positions.188 Settlement agreements in sexual 
harassment cases, however, are different as sexual harassment itself is an abuse 
of power.189 In egregious cases, like that of Weinstein, a court should find that 
NDAs are unconscionable because they encompass the required confluence of 
deceptive factors.190 First, in these cases, the parties tend to have a large ine-
quality in bargaining power.191 An agreement where one party is a low-wage 
employee and the other is a top executive at the employee’s company typically 
does not represent a true meeting of minds required for the formation of a 
binding contract.192 This is further compounded when the accused harasser is 
represented by a lawyer, but the victim is either denied the opportunity to seek 
a lawyer or is unable to afford one of comparable quality.193 Furthermore, in 
extreme cases, this difference in bargaining power can be accompanied by an 
impervious fear of retaliation.194 It is hard to imagine that anyone who is being 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Id. § 208 cmts. c–d. These factors include large inequalities in bargaining power between the 
parties; terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party; and, a gross disparity in the values ex-
changed. Id. Technically, a court could find a contract to be unconscionable even though the bargain-
ing process was fair, and it is impossible to find a single term that could be held to be unconscionable. 
Id. § 208 cmt. c. But see Motsinger v. Lithia Rose-FT, Inc., 156 P.3d 156, 165, 167 (Or. Ct. App. 
2007) (explaining that the doctrine of unconscionability provides no relief to a party from all unfavor-
able terms that result from its bargaining position, but only from terms that are unreasonably favorable 
to the party holding great bargaining power). 
 188 Julia Apostle, Weinstein’s Case Shows How Power Corrupts in Legal Settlements, FIN. TIMES 
(Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0e5561c4-af47-11e7-8076-0a4bdda92ca2. 
 189 Id.; see Dacher Keltner, Sex, Power, and the Systems That Enable Men Like Harvey Weinstein, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/sex-power-and-the-systems-that-enable-
men-like-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/CB7R-EQG3] (explaining that powerful men overesti-
mate how attracted women are to them, and often look for opportunities to engage in sexual affairs at 
the workplace). 
 190 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmts. c–d (listing the factors a court 
would consider to find a contract or term unconscionable); see also Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 191 See Roth, supra note 173 (noting the general imbalance of power between victims and perpe-
trators of sexual assault); Garrahan, supra note 48 (explaining the example of Zelda Perkins who 
signed a non-disclosure agreement against Weinstein); see also Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (ex-
plaining generally how Weinstein used his position of power and influence to force women to sign 
non-disclosure agreements). 
 192 See Apostle, supra note 188 (explaining how sexual harassment is an abuse of power); Gar-
rahan, supra note 48; see also Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (explaining Weinstein’s behavior with 
women over decades, as revealed by the New York Times’s investigation). 
 193 See Roth, supra note 173. 
 194 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (explaining how a difference in bargain-
ing power can make a contract or term unconscionable); Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures 
to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-
weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories?mbid=social_twitter [https://perma.cc/7P3A-U2NC] [hereinafter 
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threatened with harmful consequences to their career would feel that they have 
any bargaining power, or even a meaningful alternative choice, when confront-
ed with a secret settlement.195 
Second, in these cases, the terms of the agreement tend to be unreasona-
bly favorable to the stronger party.196 This is particularly the case when the 
confidentiality clause is unfairly broad and prevents victims from discussing 
anything about the events that led up to the agreement, as compared to an 
agreement that is limited to the settlement amount or terms.197 Furthermore, 
some of these agreements require victims to leave their current employment 
and sometimes even forgo other lucrative opportunities as their abusers go un-
scathed beyond the monetary payout.198 
Third, the values exchanged by the parties are grossly different.199 These 
agreements involve a victim’s sale of silence, which some argue is fair consid-
eration.200 What is missing from this equation, however, is that victims also 
walk away with the psychological and mental scars of first being abused by 
someone in power, and second, being silenced by that person for fear of retal-
                                                                                                                           
Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault]. For example, in the Weinstein case, there was 
not just a difference in bargaining power but also a real fear of retaliation. See Farrow, From Aggres-
sive Overtures to Sexual Assault, supra. Weinstein was known to target women and their careers 
simply for rejecting or rebuffing his advances. Id. Ambra Battilana Gutierrez, a Filipina-Italian ac-
tress, met Weinstein in New York City, after which her modeling agency e-mailed her to say that 
Weinstein wanted to set up a business meeting with her as soon as possible. Id. At this meeting, Wein-
stein started staring at her breasts, asking if they were real. Id. He then lunged at her, groped her 
breasts, and tried to put his hand up her skirt as she protested. Id. Following this incident, Gutierrez 
went straight to the police station to report the incident. Id. Soon after, negative articles discussing her 
sexual history and maligning her credibility began appearing in gossip magazines and newspapers. Id. 
Four other actresses, including Mira Sorvino and Rosanna Arquette, stated that after they rebuffed 
Weinstein or complained about him to the company’s executives, Weinstein retaliated against them by 
having them reassigned from projects, or by talking others into not hiring them on other projects. Id. 
Other women said that Weinstein frequently bragged about putting fake news articles in media outlets 
about those who dared to speak up against him or his abuses. Id. 
 195 Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault, supra note 194. Asia Argento, an Ital-
ian film actress and director, was forced to perform oral sex on Weinstein, but she did not feel like she 
could speak out about that experience until the emergence of the #MeToo movement. Id. She feared 
that Weinstein would “crush” her. Id. 
 196 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (explaining how weakness in the 
bargaining process can make a contract unconscionable); Roth, supra note 173 (noting the general 
imbalance of power between victims and perpetrators of sexual assault); see also Kantor & Twohey, 
supra note 1 (explaining generally how Weinstein used his position of power and influence to force 
women to sign non-disclosure agreements). 
 197 See Roth, supra note 173. 
 198 See id.; see also Pleasance, supra note 84 (explaining that Perkins was viewed as “suspect” by 
new employers after her battle with Weinstein and eventually had to leave London and move to Cen-
tral America to train horses). 
 199 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d; Roth, supra note 173. 
 200 See Roth, supra note 173. 
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iation.201 Victims who enter into these agreements tend to carry with them a 
deep sense of guilt that they cannot prevent this abuse from happening to 
someone else.202 Therefore, these agreements should be found unconscionable 
and made under duress as they are often made between parties of egregiously 
unequal bargaining power, they contain unreasonably unfavorable terms, and 
they create negative psychological effects for victims.203 
Courts can also invalidate these contracts by ruling that they are against 
public policy.204 Although public policy recognizes some positive and legiti-
mate interests in keeping certain information, like trade secrets, confidential, 
there is no comparable public policy interest in concealing information about 
sexual harassment or sexual assault.205 This is further compounded by the fact 
that in egregious cases like that of Weinstein, the harassment is often coupled 
with criminal conduct such as assault, false imprisonment, rape, and battery.206 
Public policy encourages reporting of such crimes because the abuser could 
repeat the offense with other unsuspecting individuals, and contractual provi-
sions that suppress information about such conduct undermine this policy.207 
It is clear that public policy denounces the sanctioning of contracts that 
hide crimes of assault or rape because the drafting and counseling of such con-
tracts is itself unethical.208 Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See Maitlis & Day, supra note 80 (explaining that the entire experience of first being assaulted 
by Weinstein and then negotiating the non-disclosure agreement left Perkins “broken” and distressed); 
see also Roth, supra note 173; Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault, supra note 194 
(explaining how the women who were assaulted by Weinstein were afraid of speaking out against him 
for fear of retaliation). 
 202 See Maitlis & Day, supra note 80; see also Roth, supra note 173; Garrahan, supra note 48. 
 203 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (explaining how courts can declare 
contracts void against public policy); see also Roth, supra note 173. See generally Maitlis & Day, 
supra note 80 (explaining that Perkins wanted to expose Weinstein’s behavior but was told by her 
lawyers that there was no chance that anyone would believe her). The court determines whether a 
contract or a term in a contract is unconscionable after assessing all the material facts available before 
it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. f. 
 204 Garfield, supra note 6, at 264 n. 5; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1). 
 205 See Garfield, supra note 6, at 294–95 (explaining that a court will not enforce contracts or 
contractual terms that are against public policy because they do not want to perpetuate the activity 
involved in the contract). 
 206 See id. (explaining that courts should not enforce NDAs when there is an important public 
interest that will be served by allowing the victim to speak); Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to 
Sexual Assault, supra note 194 (explaining that three women alleged that Weinstein had raped them 
by forcing them to perform oral sex or forcing vaginal sex, and four women alleged that Weinstein 
had touched them inappropriately, despite them not wanting to be touched, which could qualify as an 
assault). 
 207 Garfield, supra note 6, at 295–96 (explaining that a court will not enforce contracts or contrac-
tual terms that are against public policy because they do not want to perpetuate the activity involved in 
the contract); see Levmore & Fagan, supra note 52, at 314–15 (explaining that there are many reasons 
why an abuser would prefer to sign these contracts of silence). 
 208 Garfield, supra note 6, at 307; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (explaining 
that a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is 
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also provides two bases for determining whether a contract term is unenforce-
able on public policy grounds.209 The first indication is when legislation ex-
plicitly provides that such a bargain is unacceptable.210 But, for the public poli-
cy against sexual harassment or sexual assault, there is no standard legislative 
resolution across the states.211 If more states, however, were to adopt either 
California’s sexual felony law, or Florida’s Sunshine Act, or even successfully 
ban NDAs in cases of sexual harassment and sexual assault, a clear legislative 
intent will emerge in favor of this public policy.212 
Until more legislation emerges to aid courts, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts provides a second basis that courts can use to deem a contract term 
against public policy.213 A court should deny enforcement if, under the circum-
stances, public policy against enforcement clearly outweighs the interests in 
favor of enforcing the term.214 In balancing a public policy interest against the 
enforcement of the contract or a term, a court is likely to consider the follow-
ing factors: (1) the relative strength of that policy as evidenced by legislation 
or judicial precedent; (2) the possibility that a denial to refuse the term will 
further enhance that policy; (3) the significance of any wrongdoing and wheth-
er it was deliberate; and, (4) the connection between the wrongdoing and the 
drafting of that contract or term in the contract.215 Although the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts does not list the public policies that courts should con-
sider in this balance, it encourages courts to derive public policy from other 
laws as well as their own sense of what the public welfare requires.216 In cases 
                                                                                                                           
criminal or fraudulent); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 548 (AM. LAW. INST. 1932) (ex-
plaining that a contract concealing a crime is illegal). 
 209 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (explaining the ways in which courts 
can declare contracts void against public policy). 
 210 See id.; Garfield, supra note 6, at 296–97 (explaining that some state laws invalidate certain 
kinds of post-employment restrictions for members of specific professions, like laws declaring that 
doctors cannot be prohibited from working in the same field as their previous employer). 
 211 See Garfield, supra note 6, at 297 n.188 (explaining that for most contracts of silence, there is 
no clear legislative guidance for courts to find them against public policy). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1). 
 212 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(c) (2018). (mandating that a settlement agreement that 
prohibits the disclosure of sexual acts that can be prosecuted as a felony is “void as a matter of law 
and against public policy”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) (West 2004) (mandating that any settlement 
agreement that conceals a public hazard is “void, contrary to public policy, and may not be en-
forced”). See generally Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) (describing the proposed California 
bill in response to the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 2017) (de-
scribing the proposed New York bill in response to the #MeToo movement). 
 213 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1); Garfield, supra note 6, at 297 (ex-
plaining that when legislation does not provide guidance on a contract’s enforceability, the Restate-
ment provides a second basis that courts can use to find contracts against public policy). 
 214 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1). 
 215 See id. § 178 (3) (explaining the factors a court considers when weighing a public policy 
against the enforcement of a contract or term). 
 216 Garfield, supra note 6, at 331; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. b. 
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of sexual harassment and sexual assault, a denial to enforce an NDA or term 
will arguably meet a majority of the required factors listed above because: (1) 
it will further the policy of protecting victims who are sexually harassed and 
then silenced by their more powerful harassers; (2) it will acknowledge the 
seriousness of buying victims’ silence, particularly when the conduct that led 
up to the NDA was deliberate and habitual; and, (3) it will demonstrate the 
relationship between the rampant use of NDAs and the general disregard for 
victims.217 Given the recent rise of the #MeToo movement and the attempt by 
certain states to outright ban such agreements, courts should increasingly con-
strue public policy protections in favor of sexual assault victims and deny to 
enforce contracts that conceal such incidents.218 
B. Let the Sunshine in: More States Should Enact and Use Anti-Secrecy 
Laws to Regulate the Use of Confidential Settlements in  
Cases of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment 
In addition to the heightened role courts can play in regulating these con-
tracts, state legislators can also take the lead by introducing bold legislation 
that tackles the formation and enforcement of these pernicious agreements.219 
There are currently several states that have introduced legislation to prohibit 
NDAs in cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment.220 These proposed 
state laws differ slightly given the contexts in which they prohibit these NDAs, 
the exceptions they provide for victims who prefer to not disclose certain as-
pects of their settlement agreement, and the extent to which they deal with oth-
er related ways in which victims are often silenced.221 Victims’ rights advo-
cates have had a mixed reaction to these proposed state laws: some feel they 
are necessary to end the silence around this kind of abuse and facilitate the 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3); see also Kantor & Twohey, supra 
note 1 (exposing Weinstein’s behavior with women, which precipitated the rise of the #MeToo 
movement). 
 218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3) (discussing how a court can find a 
contract or term unenforceable on grounds of public policy); Garfield, supra note 6, at 315 (explaining 
that courts should find that public interest in disclosure is more important that enforcing a contract of 
silence that involves concealing a crime). See generally Sen. B. 820, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) 
(describing the proposed California bill in response to the #MeToo movement); Sen. B. S6382A, 
2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 2017) (describing the proposed New York bill in response to the #MeToo 
movement); see also Zacharek et al., supra note 25 (honoring the “Silence Breakers” as Time Maga-
zine’s Person of the Year). 
 219 See generally Gardner, supra note 144, at 478 (explaining that state experimentation with new 
legislation can produce beneficial results). 
 220 See, e.g., Sen. B. 3581, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017); Sen. B. S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. (N.Y. 
2017); Sen. B. 999, 2017 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2017) (proposing to void settlement agreements that 
conceal sexual misconduct). 
 221 See Roth, supra note 173; see also Colvin, supra note 5 (explaining the growing use of man-
datory arbitration clauses in employment contracts). 
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healing process for victims, but others feel that an outright ban would limit not 
only the size of settlements but also the willingness to settle in the first 
place.222 At the heart of this debate, however, is the assumption that no victim 
of sexual assault or sexual harassment would ever want to keep the abuse a 
secret and move on personally or professionally.223 This assumption is terribly 
unfounded, and thus these proposed state laws to ban NDAs in all cases of 
sexual harassment and sexual assault are short-sighted.224 
Furthermore, these laws would disproportionately impact low-wage 
workers, immigrants, and people of color.225 These workers not only tend to 
bear the burden of workplace harassment and assault, but also would now have 
to deal with low settlement amounts in return for a limited ability to speak up 
because their harassers do not tend to be the famous individuals that the larger 
public cares about.226 Thus, it is unclear whether these proposed state laws, if 
ever passed, would truly address the underlying problems of sexual assault and 
harassment and make sure that all victims are adequately supported.227 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, How to End the Silence Around Sexual-Harassment Settlements, 
THE NATION (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-end-the-silence-around-
sexual-harassment-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/V5WJ-6ADR] (explaining the conflict over banning 
confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements among advocates for victims of sexual assault). Some 
victims’ rights advocates have suggested “partial confidentiality agreements,” wherein personal de-
tails about the victim are kept secret but information that is valuable to the public and its safety is 
disclosed. Id. This kind of agreement, however, might still be problematic as without the promise of 
secrecy, abusers will be less likely to pay victims fair compensation, which would leave many victims 
without any financial means while they look for other jobs. See id. 
 223 See Grace, supra note 51 (explaining that many victims often do not want to talk about their 
abuse or the settlement agreement). 
 224 See id. (explaining that victims sometimes are very glad to be bound by a non-disclosure 
agreement, which allows them to avoid prying questions about the abuse). 
 225 See Russell-Kraft, supra note 222 (explaining the deleterious effect of outright banning confi-
dentiality clauses in settlement agreements on low-income workers and women of color). 
 226 See id. Women who are migrant workers or those who work as hotel maids are already incred-
ibly vulnerable in the workplace and these laws forcing their employers to remove all confidentiality 
clauses from a settlement agreement will further complicate their work experience and their recourse 
to relief. Id.; see Collier Meyerson, Sexual Assault When You’re on the Margins: Can We All Say 
#MeToo?, THE NATION (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/sexual-assault-when-
youre-on-the-margins-can-we-all-say-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/H3J6-M3FN] (explaining that “people 
on the margins—women of color, poor women, undocumented women, and trans men and women—
are uniquely impacted by sexual assault and harassment”). Furthermore, if employees are given the 
right to speak openly about their claims, employers too will be free to publicly denounce them. Rus-
sell-Kraft, supra note 222. 
 227 See Russell-Kraft, supra note 222. There are several alternate solutions that are popular among 
many victims’ rights advocates. Id. First, they advocate for a rule requiring all employers to collect 
and report detailed information on the number of complaints they receive in a year, whether those 
complaints involve repeat offenders, and how much the company pays to settle those complaints. Id. 
Arguably, this report, made available either to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (depending on whether the company is private or publicly trad-
ed), would offer the public important information about unwelcoming workplaces without forcing 
individual victims to speak out about their abuse. Id. Second, they also propose to put pressure on the 
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Instead of spending time and effort in passing these proposed laws that 
prohibit NDAs in cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment, state legisla-
tures around the country should follow the leads of Florida and California in 
passing anti-secrecy laws that push back against confidentiality provisions in 
these settlements.228 Egregious cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment, 
like Weinstein, can be characterized as a public risk and a safety hazard.229 
These cases also tend to include underlying criminal acts, such as rape, assault, 
battery, and false imprisonment, all of which can be prosecuted as felonies, 
thereby allowing abusers to be held accountable under the felony sex law.230 
                                                                                                                           
insurance providers that cover these secret settlements to start requiring companies to “undergo annual 
sexual-harassment trainings and audits as a condition of coverage.” Id. Even though these alternative 
solutions are commendable, arguably, they are only prospective and do not necessarily provide any 
relief to victims who have already signed these restrictive NDAs and are now looking for ways to get 
out of them. See id; e.g., Sen. B. 3581, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017); Sen. B. S6382A, 2017-2018 Assemb. 
(N.Y. 2017). 
 228 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (2004). The definition of “pub-
lic hazard” in these anti-secrecy statutes, such as the Sunshine Act, should be broadened to include 
repeat offenders of sexual assault and sexual harassment. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2); Chloe 
Roberts, The Issue with Confidential Sexual Harassment Settlements, LAW360 (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/863553/the-issue-with-confidential-sexual-harassment-settlements 
[https://perma.cc/9AR2-J264] (arguing that in the employment context, perpetrators of sexual assault 
and harassment create a public hazard that affects people beyond the victims). As defined in Florida’s 
Sunshine Act, “public hazard” means any instrumentality that has caused and is likely to cause injury, 
which courts in Florida have interpreted to denote a tangible danger to public health or safety. FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (explaining that an instrumentality includes, but is not limited to, a device, 
instrument, person, procedure, condition, or product that has caused or is likely to cause injury); Sti-
vers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “public 
hazard” connotes a tangible danger to public health or safety). Given this definition, secret settlements 
that protect sexual harassment or abuse, specifically from a repeat offender, present a tangible danger 
to the public, lawyers, and the legal system in general. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (defining 
“public hazard” as used in the statute); see also Roberts, supra. 
 229 See Richard A. Rosen & Karen S. Kennedy, New Developments in State Protective Order 
Legislation and Procedural Rules, C915 ALI–ABA 315, 317, 321 (Feb. 7, 1994) (explaining that 
Florida’s Sunshine Act was passed in the context of a national impetus to limit the use of secret set-
tlements covering documents and information that involved hiding a public hazard). The rationale 
behind the movement was that protective orders and sealed court records were “being used with in-
creasing frequency to hide deadly product defects” and, as a result, “important information affecting 
public health and safety [was concealed] from public view.” Miller, supra note 156, at 430–31, 442; 
see Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 230 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002; Roberts, supra note 228. In the employment context, sex-
ual harassers who go unchecked due to the rampant use of confidential settlements create a public 
hazard that puts other employees in the workplace at a greater risk of becoming victims of abuse 
themselves. See Roberts, supra note 228. Although sexual harassment in the workplace is typically a 
civil matter, it is almost always accompanied by acts that are criminal in nature. See Mark W. Lerner 
& Jessica T. Rosenberg, When Sexual Harassment Is Also a Crime, N.Y. L. J. (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/02/28/when-sexual-harassment-is-also-a-crime/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZA5-HCHT] (explaining that although sexual harassment in the workplace has 
traditionally been a matter of civil enforcement, there are some elements of harassment that violate 
criminal laws); Roberts, supra note 228. Individually, these crimes all qualify as a “public hazard” as 
these are all instrumentalities that can cause, have caused, and will continue to cause a tangible danger 
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Moreover, the protection or warning offered to lawyers who engage in such 
agreements in the actual text of California’s felony sex law, if replicated in 
other states, would serve to deter lawyers from engaging in these settle-
ments.231 Given that there is no clear answer to end the silence around work-
place sexual assault and sexual harassment, states should not shy away from 
employing any and all tactics, particularly those that take the middle ground 
and do not advocate for a complete ban on NDAs in violation of what many 
victims may want.232 
                                                                                                                           
to public safety. See Lerner & Rosenberg, supra; see also Stivers, 777 So. 2d at 1026 (holding that 
“public hazard” connotes a tangible danger to public health or safety); Farrow, From Aggressive 
Overtures to Sexual Assault, supra note 194 (explaining how a few women came out with rape allega-
tions against Weinstein). In these cases, California’s felony sex law could also provide relief to vic-
tims. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002. Furthermore, the definition of “public hazard” in the Sun-
shine Act includes “people” and “conditions” that could give rise to a tangible danger, and one can 
infer that the Florida legislature thus intended for these words to be used in the context of individuals 
who, by their actions, create a risky environment for those around them. See Roberts, supra note 228; 
see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (defining “public hazard”). 
 231 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (e) (“An attorney’s failure to comply with the requirements 
of this section by demanding that a provision be included in a settlement agreement that prevents the 
disclosure of factual information related to the action described in subdivision (a) that is not otherwise 
authorized by subdivision (c) as a condition of settlement, or advising a client to sign an agreement 
that includes such a provision, may be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar of Cali-
fornia shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such case brought to its attention.”). 
 232 See Russell-Kraft, supra note 222 (explaining both the pros and cons of banning confidentiali-
ty clauses in settlement agreements). If anti-secrecy laws, such as the Sunshine Act, were adopted and 
implemented successfully in many states, with a broadened definition of “public hazard” that includes 
repeat offenders, a court would have a difficult time holding that cases similar to Weinstein’s do not 
present a tangible danger to public safety.” See Roberts, supra note 228 (arguing how Florida’s anti-
secrecy laws can and should be expanded to cover non-disclosure agreements in cases of sexual as-
sault). See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West 2004); Stivers, 777 So. 2d at 1026 (holding 
that “public hazard” connotes a tangible danger to public health or safety). Consequently, no court 
would be able to uphold an agreement concealing this “public hazard,” which would allow more 
women to speak up about their abuse without fear of retribution. See Roberts, supra note 228; see also 
Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (explaining Weinstein’s behavior with women, as revealed by the 
New York Times’s investigation). See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2). The National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) under President Barack Obama indicated “strong disfavor of confidentiality 
obligations” incorporated in NDAs. Jay M. Dade, NLRB Poised to Revisit “Confidential” Severance 
Agreements and Leap into the National #MeToo Discussion, POLSINELLI AT WORK (Jan 11, 2018), 
http://www.polsinelliatwork.com/blog/2018/1/11/nlrb-poised-to-revisit-confidential-severance-
agreements-and-leap-into-the-national-metoo-discussion [https://perma.cc/P2VR-LWTQ]. Previously, 
the NLRB had prohibited such confidentiality clauses because they are overbroad and infringe on the 
rights of employees to engage in protected activities under the National Labor Relations Act. Id.; see 
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (protecting employees’ rights to concerted 
activity). The NLRB under President Donald Trump, however, is already rolling-back a number of 
these policies. See Mark Joseph Stern, Donald Trump, Union Buster, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/12/donald_trump_s_union_
busting_appointees_just_incinerated_obama_s_labor_legacy.html [https://perma.cc/7FLD-3KYF] 
(explaining how President Trump’s labor policies have reversed course for the NLRB since President 
Obama’s time in the White House). Furthermore, given President Trump’s own track record on the 
#MeToo movement, it is not surprising that he has yet to show any executive leadership on tackling 
the issues raised by the movement. See Landler, supra note 35 (analyzing the President Trump’s 
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C. Anti-Secrecy Laws Should Be Broadened to Include Consequences  
for Attorneys Who Demand Secrecy from Victims of  
Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment 
When dealing with secret settlements in cases of sexual assault or sexual 
harassment, attorneys are required to choose between two competing ethical 
obligations: the duty to their client, and the duty to the public at large.233 But, 
they should not have to make this choice.234 Given the purpose and scope of 
anti-secrecy laws, they can be drafted in a way that is wholly consistent with 
the existing ethical obligations of lawyers.235 One of the primary incentives 
behind the passage of the Sunshine Act, for example, was to put an end to 
threats to public safety based on specific harmful outcomes resulting from se-
cret settlements.236 Some lawyers who supported this law, however, also saw it 
as a means to lessen the ethical dilemmas faced by plaintiffs’ lawyers.237 For 
example, when an individual or a company offers an attractive settlement to a 
sexual abuse victim that conditions the settlement on a non-disclosure provi-
sion, the lawyer is obliged to accept that offer if her client wants her to do 
so.238 By accepting this deal, however, she is essentially agreeing to keep under 
                                                                                                                           
tweets on the #MeToo movement). Thus, it is truly up to the states to take the lead and institute bold 
legislative reform in this realm that will protect all victims, both women and men, of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment. See id.; see also Gardner, supra note 144, at 478 (explaining that state experi-
mentation with new legislation can produce beneficial results). 
 233 Sullivan, supra note 160, at 930–31. 
 234 See id. at 931–35 (explaining that an attorney’s duty to the public could be just as critical as 
his or her duty to zealously represent their client). 
 235 See id. at 935 (explaining that the Sunshine Act is an example of legislation that can be used to 
eliminate the choice between an attorney’s ethical obligations to his or her client and their ethical duty 
owed to the public at-large). 
 236 See generally James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, TRIAL, June 2003, at 18–25 (illustrat-
ing that the position of Sunshine advocates has foundation in specific cases allegedly involving secret 
settlements, such as sexual abuse by priests, Firestone tires, and some baby products); see also Susan 
P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Some-
thing in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 783–85 (2002) (discussing the Firestone tire shredding 
settlements); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t Know Can 
Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 115, 119–21 (1999) (describing secret settle-
ments concerning dangers from the drug Zomax, the sleep aid Halcion, the Dalkon shield contracep-
tive device, the Shiley heart valve, and General Motors side-mounted gas tanks). 
 237 See Miller, supra note 148, at 380 (noting that proponents of anti-secrecy legislation believe 
that such laws will help alleviate the dilemma facing lawyers working on cases involving sexual as-
sault or sexual harassment); Elizabeth E. Spainhour, Unsealing Settlements: Recent Efforts to Expose 
Settlement Agreements That Conceal Public Hazards, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2155, 2161 (2004) (explaining 
how some lawyers view anti-secrecy laws such as those in Florida as a means to reduce the ethical 
dilemma faced by lawyers when working on cases involving sexual assault or sexual harassment); 
Zitrin, supra note 236, at 115 (explaining that unless “sunshine laws” are passed in more states, there 
is little lawyers can do when their clients demand to keep the sexual misconduct a secret). 
 238 See Spainhour, supra note 237, at 2162; see also Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence 
Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 561 (2008) (explaining that law-
yers face “substantial economic and cultural pressures” to deal their obligations to their clients 
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wraps the identity of an abuser who might very well continue to abuse other 
victims thereafter.239 Thus, even though the attorney succeeds in upholding the 
utmost duty she owes to her client, she fails in her ethical and moral duties 
owed to the public.240 A lawyer’s duty owed to the public, although not enun-
ciated as clearly as the duty a lawyer owes to his or her client, is also present in 
the ethical code that governs their practice.241 
One way to assist lawyers in balancing these duties effectively is to enact 
and use anti-secrecy laws like those passed in Florida and California.242 As 
                                                                                                                           
through the lens of a client-centered approach that holds zealous advocacy on a higher pedestal than 
societal values). This professional obligation, however, leaves very little wiggle room for attorneys 
who wish to refrain from participating in such confidential settlements. See Bauer, supra, at 498 (ex-
plaining that the standard view of the ethics rules leaves lawyers who would like to say no to confi-
dential agreements with little room to maneuver). 
 239 See Miller, supra note 148, at 380; Spainhour, supra note 237, at 2162 (explaining that a law-
yer in a product defect case owes no duty to members of the general public who may be harmed down 
the road by the same product). 
 240 See Paul F. Rothstein, “Anything You Say May Be Used Against You”: A Proposed Seminar 
on the Lawyer’s Duty to Warn of Confidentiality’s Limits in a Post-Enron World, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1745, 1747 (2007) (arguing that post-Enron, attorneys are encouraged more and more to reveal 
information of fraud or wrongdoing that has the potential to seriously harm the public); Sullivan, 
supra note 160, at 934–35. 
 241 Sullivan, supra note 160, at 931. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also recognize 
these co-existing duties for a lawyer. See id. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. 
These rules acknowledge that lawyers are public citizens in addition to being advocates for their cli-
ents. See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 931; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 6 
(“As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the 
administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession . . . . [A] lawyer 
should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system 
because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to 
maintain their authority.”). For example, Model Rule 1.2, which prohibits a lawyer from counseling or 
assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, allows the public good to 
take precedence over a lawyer’s duty to her client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d); 
see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 171, at 51 (explaining that Model Rule 1.2(d) is mandatory, 
meaning a lawyer may not participate in a crime or fraud under any circumstances). Furthermore, 
Model Rule 1.6 suggests that a lawyer should take into consideration the potential damage to a third 
party or to the public and is permitted to reveal information when it is necessary. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b); see also Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A 
Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW 143, 186 (2002) (explaining that although the duty 
of confidentiality between a lawyer and her client is sacred, it is not absolute); Zacharias & Green, 
supra note 171, at 53, 56 (explaining that Rule 1.6 is designed to appeal to lawyers’ sense of morality, 
encouraging them to act just like ordinary ethical citizens). Given that the repeated abuse by individu-
als like Weinstein presents a reasonably certain risk of injury or harm to others, entering into a settle-
ment agreement that takes away both the victim’s and her lawyer’s ability to disclose that information 
undermines the purposes of Rule 1.6. See Koniak, supra note 236, at 808 (arguing that if the ethics 
rules are adopted as law in any state, it would make it unethical for a lawyer to enter into an agree-
ment that conceals sexual misconduct). See generally Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (outlining 
Weinstein’s behavior with women over decades, as revealed by the New York Times’s investigation). 
 242 See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 935 (explaining that the Sunshine in Litigation Act is a step 
toward solving the dilemma between a lawyer’s conflicting duty to her client and to the public); see 
also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(e) (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004). 
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explained above, California’s felony sex law, on its face, explicitly provides 
consequences for attorneys who fail to comply with the law.243 An attorney 
who drafts a confidentiality clause that conceals conduct that can be prosecut-
ed as a felony sex offense, or even advises a client to sign such an agreement, 
may be disciplined by the State Bar of California.244 More states should there-
fore adopt a version of this law, as it serves as an explicit warning to lawyers 
engaging in these settlements and, in some ways, heightens the duty that they 
owe to society.245 
Furthermore, even if these laws don’t explicitly provide consequences for 
attorneys, enacting them will serve to deter attorneys who try to draft these kinds 
of agreements because of the low likelihood that a court will uphold such an 
agreement in the event of a breach.246 These laws will also give lawyers who 
counsel victims the strength to refuse such clauses and help them stay true to 
their professional obligations to their clients.247 In sum, anti-secrecy laws should 
                                                                                                                           
 243 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(e); see supra notes 168–172 and accompanying text. 
 244 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(e). 
 245 See id.; Koniak, supra note 236, at 808; see also Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Army of 
Spies, NEW YORKER (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-
army-of-spies [https://perma.cc/M8AU-JREA] [hereinafter Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Army of 
Spies]. In the fall of 2016, Weinstein hired private security companies, including Kroll, one of the 
world’s largest corporate-intelligence companies, and Black Cube, an enterprise run largely by former 
officers of Mossad and other Israeli intelligence agencies, to collect information on the women com-
ing forward with stories of his abuse over decades. Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Army of Spies, supra. 
The goal of these investigations was to stop the publication of the abuse allegations against Weinstein 
that were eventually published in the New York Times on October 17, 2017. Id. These efforts were run 
in large part through Weinstein’s lawyers, including David Boies, an attorney, who personally signed 
the contract ordering Black Cube to uncover information that would help halt the publication of the 
New York Times story about Weinstein’s abuses and his secret settlements with the women. Id. 
 246 See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 935 (explaining that absent any direction from the state legis-
latures on what lawyers should do when faced with confidential settlements involving a public health 
or safety hazard, lawyers will continue to be forced to “balance their competing obligation to the pub-
lic and to their clients most often at the expense of the public welfare”); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 1002(e); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081. 
 247 See Spainhour, supra note 237, at 2162 (explaining that a law that prohibits secret settlements 
that hide a public hazard would effectively prevent lawyers from drafting and counseling clients to 
accept these agreements); Garrahan, supra note 48 (recounting how lawyers kept a lid on Weinstein’s 
abuses, particularly in the case of Zelda Perkins, by using NDAs). In the case of Perkins, who was 
abused and harassed by Weinstein, her lawyers would not have been forced to advise her that her only 
recourse was to sign a damages agreement that included a non-disclosure agreement if they had been 
in a jurisdiction that recognized anti-secrecy laws such as the Sunshine Act or the felony sex law. See 
Garrahan, supra note 48. Upon realizing that Weinstein was asking their client to sign a non-
disclosure agreement that would prohibit the world from ever finding out about his abuses, thus put-
ting other innocent people at risk, Perkins’ lawyers could have derived strength from these laws to 
refuse such an agreement and still stand true to their professional obligations as lawyers. See id.; see 
also Sullivan, supra note 160, at 935 (summarizing co-existing duties lawyers owe to their clients and 
to the public at-large). 
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be enacted and used to ease the ethical burden placed on attorneys and remind 
them they are not merely officers of the court, but also officers of society.248 
CONCLUSION 
The #MeToo movement brought to light the business of buying silence 
among wrongdoers, courts, lawyers, lawmakers, and victims. At the center of 
this debate is a discussion about how we view our legal system and what we 
expect out of it. This debate, however, would be a non-starter if we could as-
sume away a few key things: first, that no victim of sexual assault or sexual 
harassment ever wants to keep the abuse a secret and move on personally and 
professionally; and, second, that the state and our judiciary always has the 
right to interfere in private contracts between private parties. These assump-
tions, however, are baseless, and the recent step taken by some state legisla-
tures to completely prohibit NDAs in cases of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault lacks foresight and careful thought. As this Note explains above, what 
we need is our courts, lawyers, and state legislators to take on a bigger role 
when forming, advising, enforcing, and legislating such agreements. Although 
the notion of freedom of contract will forever remain embedded in our juris-
prudence, these individual players in the regime of silence need to come to 
terms with the consequences of their actions on both victims and to society in 
general. The #MeToo movement has truly been a moment of reckoning for us 
as a society, and we need to capitalize on this moment to show victims that 
they are not alone, and that the legal system works to protect them and other 
potential victims down the line, should they choose to speak out. 
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 248 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(e) (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004); see also 
RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: 
TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 245 (1999). Lawyers must return to being professionals, not 
mere business-people. Id. Being professional, however, means recognizing the double duty owed to 
their clients, as well as to the society. Id. Lawyers cannot fool themselves into ignorance, especially 
when it works to their advantage. Id. Although lawyers may not always know what the truth is, they 
do know what a lie is and, thus, they must not only accept this knowledge, but also act on it by accept-
ing their moral responsibility. Id. at 245–46. 
  
 
